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How would the world appear to us if its ontology was that of classical mechanics but every agent
faced a restriction on how much they could come to know about the classical state? We show that
in most respects, it would appear to us as quantum. The statistical theory of classical mechanics,
which specifies how probability distributions over phase space evolve under Hamiltonian evolution
and under measurements, is typically called Liouville mechanics, so the theory we explore here is
Liouville mechanics with an epistemic restriction. The particular epistemic restriction we posit as
our foundational postulate specifies two constraints. The first constraint is a classical analogue of
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle – the second-order moments of position and momentum defined
by the phase-space distribution that characterizes an agent’s knowledge are required to satisfy the
same constraints as are satisfied by the moments of position and momentum observables for a
quantum state. The second constraint is that the distribution should have maximal entropy for the
given moments. Starting from this postulate, we derive the allowed preparations, measurements and
transformations and demonstrate that they are isomorphic to those allowed in Gaussian quantum
mechanics and generate the same experimental statistics. We argue that this reconstruction of
Gaussian quantum mechanics constitutes additional evidence in favour of a research program wherein
quantum states are interpreted as states of incomplete knowledge, and that the phenomena that do
not arise in Gaussian quantum mechanics provide the best clues for how one might reconstruct the
full quantum theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is innovative about quantum mechanics from the
perspective of classical physics? The thesis we shall de-
fend in this article is that a large part of quantum me-
chanics can be understood as arising from a single innova-
tion relative to classical theories: there is a restriction on
how much any agent can know about the physical state
of a classical system. To be a bit more precise, the claim
is that if one begins with the statistical classical the-
ory, which is to say the one that quantitatively describes
an agent’s knowledge of a classical system and therefore
specifies how probability distributions over the classical
state space evolve over time and how they are updated in
the course of measurements, and if one then assumes as a
new fundamental postulate that agents are restricted in
the sorts of knowledge they can have about the classical
state (or equivalently, the form of the probability distri-
butions they can prepare), then one can derive a large
part of quantum mechanics in the sense of reproducing
its operational predictions.
We shall consider classical particle mechanics here.
The statistical theory in this case is known as Liouville
mechanics. The restriction on knowledge that we adopt,
and which we shall refer to as the epistemic restriction,
is inspired by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle together
with a principle of entropy maximization. We derive
which preparations, measurements and transformations
are consistent with the epistemic restriction. The result
is a theory that we refer to as epistemically-restricted Li-
ouville mechanics, or ERL mechanics. We then demon-
strate its equivalence to a subtheory of quantum mechan-
ics which we call Gaussian quantum mechanics (about
which we shall say more in a moment). Significantly,
this implies that all phenomena arising in Gaussian quan-
tum mechanics can be interpreted in terms of probability
distributions over a classical phase space. ERL mechan-
ics provides a noncontextual hidden variable model for
Gaussian quantum mechanics1.
Within this model, all quantum states are represented
by probability distributions that cover a non-vanishing
volume of the phase space. Consequently, they corre-
spond to states of incomplete knowledge about the phys-
ical state of the system. Furthermore, non-orthogonal
quantum states correspond to overlapping probability
distributions. Consequently, many distinct quantum
states are consistent with the system being at a par-
ticular point in phase space; a change in the quantum
state need not imply a change in reality. Theories of this
sort have been described as ψ-epistemic [2, 3]. ERL me-
chanics therefore provides a ψ-epistemic hidden variable
model for Gaussian quantum mechanics. The success of
this model in reproducing aspects of quantum theory pro-
vides additional evidence in favour of interpretations of
quantum theory where quantum states describe states of
incomplete knowledge rather than states of reality.
We define Gaussian quantum mechanics in terms of
1 The model is noncontextual in the generalized sense defined in
[1].
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2the Wigner representation. Among pure states, it is well
known that a wavefunction has a magnitude with Gaus-
sian profile over configuration space if and only if the
state admits of a Gaussian (hence non-negative) Wigner
representation, and that these are the only pure states
that have a non-negative Wigner representation [4]. We
here consider a mixed state to be Gaussian only if it
has a Gaussian Wigner representation2. For all Gaussian
states, the Wigner representation can be interpreted as
a probability distribution over phase space. The abil-
ity to interpret the Wigner representation of a state as
a probability distribution over phase space is sometimes
taken as a condition for classicality. However, as em-
phasized in Ref. [6], this is not sufficient, because one
needs to verify that the entire experiment, including the
measurements and transformations, admits of a classical
explanation. We take the Gaussian measurements to be
those associated with positive operator valued measures
(POVMs) all the elements of which have Gaussian (hence
non-negative) Wigner representations. This ensures that
they can be interpreted as indicator functions (sometimes
called “response” functions), which specify the condi-
tional probability of the associated outcome for every
classical phase space point. Similarly, we take the Gaus-
sian transformations to be those associated with com-
pletely positive maps (CP maps) that also have Gaussian
(hence non-negative) Wigner representations, which en-
sures that they can be interpreted as transition probabili-
ties over the phase space. To summarize, Gaussian quan-
tum mechanics is defined as the subtheory of quantum
mechanics3 including only those preparations, measure-
ments and transformations that have Gaussian Wigner
representations, and as we have just noted (and will ex-
plain more carefully in Sec. IV B), all such procedures
can be given a classical statistical interpretation. We
prove that ERL mechanics is operationally equivalent to
Gaussian quantum mechanics by demonstrating that it
reproduces the Wigner representation of the latter.
For those familiar with the Wigner representation, the
definition of Gaussian quantum mechanics we are adopt-
ing here will seem natural, and the possibility of a classi-
cal statistical interpretation of this subtheory of quantum
mechanics will come as no surprise. What is not so obvi-
ous, and what it is the purpose of this article to demon-
strate, is that it is possible to derive Gaussian quantum
mechanics starting from Liouville mechanics and impos-
ing a restriction on knowledge. This is a distinction worth
emphasizing. Finding a subtheory of quantum mechanics
admitting a non-negative Wigner representation is pri-
2 Note that these are not the only mixed states that have non-
negative Wigner representations – mixing Gaussian pure states
with a non-Gaussian measure, for instance, can yield such a state
[5].
3 Note that, following Ref. [7], the Gaussian subtheory of quan-
tum mechanics can be obtained from full quantum mechanics by
applying a constraint to motion (in the sense of Dirac [8]).
marily an exercise in interpretation – one starts from the
quantum formalism and proceeds to find a representation
that admits of an interpretation in terms of noncontex-
tual hidden variables. By contrast, showing that one
can derive this subtheory of quantum mechanics starting
from classical mechanics and imposing a restriction on
knowledge is primarily an exercise in axiomatization4.
Of course, only part of quantum mechanics, the Gaus-
sian part, has been derived. We have claimed above
that this constitutes a “large part” of quantum mechan-
ics, but a skeptic may rightfully ask what is meant by
this. Insofar as Gaussian quantum mechanics admits
only quadratic Hamiltonians, it might seem to be a very
small (and some might say uninteresting) part of the
theory. We argue that it does capture a large part of
quantum mechanics in the sense that it captures a large
number of the qualitative phenomena that are usually
highlighted as nonclassical, i.e., those that are usually
deemed to rule out a classical worldview. It is this sort
of counting that we feel to be significant for the project
of understanding what is innovative about quantum the-
ory from a classical perspective5. And by these lights,
the counting is very favorable. ERL mechanics succeeds
at reproducing: (i) most basic quantum phenomena (in-
cluding the “usual suspects” on the list of phenomena
that seem to defy classical explanation), for instance,
the existence of complementary measurements (i.e., that
cannot be implemented jointly), the existence of noncom-
muting measurements (i.e., where the statistics depend
on the order in which they are implemented), the col-
lapse of the wavefunction, and the no-cloning theorem;
(ii) most of the information-processing tasks that dis-
tinguish quantum theory from classical theories, such as
teleportation, key distribution, quantum error correction,
and improvements in metrology; (iii) a large part of en-
tanglement theory, for instance, the monogamy of pure
entanglement, distillation, deterministic and probabilis-
tic single copy entanglement transformation, catalysis,
etcetera; (iv) a large part of what might be termed the
“statistical structure” of quantum theory, such as the iso-
morphism between operations on a system and states on
a pair of systems (the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism
[9]), the fact that every mixed state has multiple convex
decompositions into pure states and multiple extensions
to a pure state on a larger system (purifications), the fact
that every unsharp measurement can be considered to be
a sharp measurement on a larger system (the Naimark
extension [9]), the fact that every irreversible transfor-
mation can be obtained by a reversible transformation
4 Indeed, imposing an epistemic restriction on a statistical classical
theory can be understood as a novel kind of quantization scheme,
although, strictly speaking, it may not deserve the title given that
it generally returns only a subtheory of quantum theory or an
analogue thereof.
5 And likewise for the project of finding physical principles that
have some hope of implying quantum theory; see below.
3on a larger system (the Stinespring dilation [9]).
But what is the point of deriving only part of quantum
theory? Why is a subtheory of quantum mechanics such
as Gaussian quantum mechanics interesting? We are cer-
tainly not proposing this theory as an empirical competi-
tor to quantum theory. It is straightforward to prepare
Hamiltonians that are not quadratic in position and mo-
mentum and hence to demonstrate the existence of deter-
ministic dynamics that is not part of Gaussian quantum
mechanics. Indeed, there is a large range of quantum
phenomena that have been predicted and observed in
continuous-variable systems for which a description re-
quires non-Gaussian operations, such as states with neg-
ative Wigner functions [10–14]. Rather, such theories are
of interest as foils to quantum theory. They depict ways
in which the world might have been. This is useful for
identifying principles from which one can derive quantum
theory because it is only by describing a broad landscape
of possible theories that we can specify the sense in which
quantum theory is special. Foil theories that reproduce
many quantum phenomena (such as the one considered
here) are particularly useful for ruling out possible axiom
schemes. For instance, if one is contemplating a possi-
ble axiom scheme and all of the axioms hold true for
Gaussian quantum mechanics, then one recognizes im-
mediately that they are not sufficient for deriving the
whole of quantum mechanics. One needs to look at the
phenomena that Gaussian quantum mechanics does not
reproduce in order to find an adequate set of axioms.
The most significant phenomena that are not in-
cluded in Gaussian quantum mechanics are as follows.
Bell inequality violations [15] are not included because
epistemically-restricted Liouville mechanics provides a
local hidden variable model for Gaussian quantum me-
chanics. Indeed, locality for bipartite continuous-variable
EPR experiments was already established in Refs. [16,
17]. The Kochen-Specker theorem [18] is not included,
nor are violations of operational noncontextuality in-
equalities, as defined in Ref. [19]. This follows from the
fact that epistemically-restricted Liouville mechanics is a
noncontextual hidden variable model, or equivalently be-
cause the Wigner representation is a nonnegative quasi-
probability representation and any such representation is
a noncontextual hidden variable model [6]. Exponential
speed-up for computation is not included (assuming it ex-
ists) [20]. This follows from the existence of an efficient
classical simulation of Gaussian quantum mechanics [21].
Quantum interference phenomena and quantization of
quantities such as angular momentum and energy are
also absent from the theory. Another example is the phe-
nomenon described in the recent article by Pusey, Barrett
and Rudolph [22], which can be understood as a viola-
tion of a notion of noncontextuality for preparations [1].
There is little doubt that a direct test of the predictions
of Gaussian quantum mechanics versus the predictions
of the full quantum theory on any of these fronts would
rule in favour of the full quantum theory. Proposals for
experimental tests of the Bell inequalities for continuous
variable systems have been made in Refs. [23–28].
An even more informative distinction is between phe-
nomenon that can occur in some classical statistical the-
ory with an epistemic restriction (not necessarily clas-
sical particle mechanics), and those that cannot. For
instance, for phenomena that are characteristic of finite-
dimensional quantum systems, the relevant question is
whether they arise in statistical theories of discrete clas-
sical systems, such as the theory considered in Ref. [2].
As another example, interference and quantization phe-
nomena may yet be incorporated under the umbrella of
epistemically-restricted statistical theories wherein the
ontology is fields rather than particles. The phenom-
ena of nonlocality, contextuality and quantum exponen-
tial speed-up are distinguished in the list insofar as they
are clearly insensitive to the degree of freedom one is
considering.
This categorization of phenomena – into those which
arise in classical statistical theories with an epistemic re-
striction and those which do not – is a useful application
of our results. From the perspective of the ψ-epistemic re-
search program, there are two tiers of nonclassicality: the
first tier contains the phenomena that can be explained
merely by postulating an epistemic restriction but main-
taining the notion of an underlying classical ontology,
while the second tier contains the rest. For the purposes
of moving the research program forward, it is the sec-
ond tier that is the most interesting, for it is by studying
these phenomena that one can hope to deduce additional
principles that might supplement the epistemic restric-
tion and allow a derivation of the full quantum theory.
Consequently, it is useful to categorize as many phenom-
ena as possible in order to extend the list of second tier
phenomena.
Nonetheless, we feel that the diversity and founda-
tional importance of the quantum phenomena that can
be reproduced in classical epistemically-restricted theo-
ries suggests that there is something right about this re-
search program. In particular, its success suggests to us
that there may be an axiomatization of quantum theory
of the following sort. The first axiom states that there is a
fundamental restriction on how much observers can know
about systems. The second embodies some novel princi-
ple about reality (rather than our knowledge thereof).
Ultimately, the first axiom ought to be derivable from
the second because what one physical system can know
about another ought to be a consequence of the nature
of the dynamical laws.
A. Previous work that is relevant to this article
The idea that quantum states are states of incomplete
knowledge (i.e., epistemic states) rather than states of re-
ality (i.e., ontic states) is an old one. In Ref. [3], it is ar-
gued that Einstein was an early advocate of ψ-epistemic
hidden variable models.
... I incline to the opinion that the wave func-
4tion does not (completely) describe what is
real, but only a (to us) empirically accessible
maximal knowledge regarding that which re-
ally exists [...] This is what I mean when I ad-
vance the view that quantum mechanics gives
an incomplete description of the real state of
affairs.
–A. Einstein [29]
E. T. Jaynes, famous for his information-theoretic deriva-
tion of many results of classical thermodynamics [30],
also argued that many results in quantum theory could
be understood in this manner, but that a prerequisite
for doing so is to properly distinguish between ontic and
epistemic concepts in quantum theory.
...present quantum theory not only does not
use – it does not even dare to mention – the
notion of a “real physical situation.” Defend-
ers of the theory say that this notion is philo-
sophically naive, a throwback to outmoded
ways of thinking, and that recognition of this
constitutes deep new wisdom about the nature
of human knowledge. I say that it consti-
tutes a violent irrationality, that somewhere
in this theory the distinction between reality
and our knowledge of reality has become lost,
and the result has more the character of me-
dieval necromancy than of science.
–E.T. Jaynes [31]
But our present QM formalism is not purely
epistemological; it is a peculiar mixture de-
scribing in part realities of Nature, in part
incomplete human information about Nature
— all scrambled up by Heisenberg and Bohr
into an omelette that nobody has seen how to
unscramble. Yet we think that the unscram-
bling is a prerequisite for any further advance
in basic physical theory. For, if we cannot
separate the subjective and objective aspects
of the formalism, we cannot know what we
are talking about; it is just that simple.
–E.T. Jaynes [32]
Ballentine has argued in favour of the thesis that quan-
tum states describe the statistical properties of a virtual
ensemble of systems, which is equivalent to saying that
it describes one’s limited information about a single sys-
tem drawn from the ensemble [33, 34]. More recent work
that we take to be indicative of the explanatory power of
ψ-epistemic hidden variable models for quantum theory
are Refs. [2, 35–37].
There is also much interest in the notion that quan-
tum states are states of knowledge outside the context of
hidden variable approaches. Given that pure quantum
states are the ones with maximum information content
(i.e., the most predictability), if one accepts that even
these are epistemic, one is accepting that maximal in-
formation is not complete information. This is a notion
that has been popular of late as a principle from which
quantum theory might be derived. For instance, it is cen-
tral to the quantum Bayesian or “Q-bist” research pro-
gram of Fuchs and his collaborators [38–42]. The work
of Leifer and developments thereof [43, 44] are also along
this vein. The idea also appears in the context of oper-
ational reconstructions of quantum theory, for instance,
in Refs. [45–47].
It should be noted that researchers who may agree that
quantum states are states of incomplete knowledge may
still not agree on what this knowledge is knowledge about.
For instance, in quantum Bayesianism, it is about the
“outcomes of future interventions” on the system rather
than about some pre-existing reality. Because of Bell’s
theorem and the Kochen-Specker theorem, it is clear that
if quantum states are states of incomplete knowledge,
this knowledge cannot be about local and noncontextual
hidden variables. But local and noncontextual hidden
variables do not necessarily exhaust the possibilities for
something to meet the description of a pre-existing re-
ality and consequently there may still be room for an
interpretation along these lines. Indeed, this is the idea
of the speculative axiomatization described above.
The previous work that is most relevant to this article
is Ref. [2], where an epistemic restriction is applied in
the context of a classical theory of systems with discrete
state spaces to obtain a “toy theory” that is very close
– but not equivalent – to a subset of quantum theory,
namely, the stabilizer formalism for qubits. The present
work can be seen as an application to continuous variable
systems of the idea proposed there.
B. Structure of the paper
We review the key features of quantum mechanics and
Liouville mechanics in Sec. II, focusing on the proper-
ties that are important for our discussion. We introduce
ERL mechanics in Sec. III, first with a formulation of the
epistemic constraint (Sec. III A), as well as a pedagogical
discussion of the basic features of this theory (Sec. III B)
along with an analysis of some of the quantum phenom-
ena that it reproduces (Sec. III C). Our main result is
presented in Sec. IV, where we prove the operational
equivalence of ERL mechanics and Gaussian quantum
mechanics.
II. PRELIMINARIES
The restriction we adopt is motivated by Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle in quantum theory, so we begin
with a review of the latter in Sec. II A, focussing on the
particular elements that will be important for ERL me-
chanics. Next, in Sec. II B, we review the formulation of
Liouville mechanics.
5A. Quantum Mechanics
For a system with a configuration described by n de-
grees of freedom (e.g., 1 particle in n dimensions, n/3
particles in 3 dimensions, n particles in 1 dimension,
etcetera), the 2n canonical operators for the positions
{qˆi, i = 1, . . . , n} and corresponding momenta {pˆi, i =
1, . . . , n} satisfy [qˆi, pˆj ] = i~δij Iˆ, with Iˆ the identity op-
erator. We express the 2n canonical operators in the
form of phase space coordinates, defining zˆ2i−1 = qˆi
and zˆ2i = pˆi for i = 1, . . . , n. These operators satisfy
[zˆi, zˆj ] = i~Σij , with Σ the skew-symmetric 2n× 2n ma-
trix Σij = δi,j+1 − δi+1,j , that is,
Σ =

0 −1 0 0 . . .
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0
...
. . .
 (1)
The state of a quantum system is described by a den-
sity operator ρ. For a state ρ, the means of the canonical
operators are defined to be
di(ρ) = Tr(ρzˆi), (2)
and the covariance matrix is defined as
γij(ρ) = Tr
(
ρ(zˆi − di)(zˆj − dj)
)− i~Σij
= 2Re Tr
(
ρ(zˆi − di)(zˆj − dj)
)
, (3)
where the operator ordering in this definition is chosen
such that γij is Hermitian. In terms of the covariance
matrix, a general form of the quantum uncertainty prin-
ciple can be expressed as
γ(ρ) + i~Σ ≥ 0 . (4)
This can be derived from the canonical commutation re-
lations of the operators [48].
For illustration, we now show that this inequality re-
duces to the usual uncertainty relation for a single system
in 1 dimension (single qˆ and pˆ). We have
γ(ρ) =
(
2(∆q)2 〈qˆpˆ+ pˆqˆ〉 − 2〈qˆ〉〈pˆ〉
〈qˆpˆ+ pˆqˆ〉 − 2〈qˆ〉〈pˆ〉 2(∆p)2
)
,
(5)
where (∆q)2 = 〈(qˆ − 〈q〉)2〉 and similarly for (∆p)2. The
condition γ(ρˆ) + i~Σ ≥ 0 for a 2× 2 matrix is equivalent
to det(γ(ρˆ) + i~Σ) ≥ 0. Thus,
4(∆q)2(∆p)2 ≥ (〈qˆpˆ+ pˆqˆ〉 − 2〈qˆ〉〈pˆ〉)2 + ~2 , (6)
which implies the standard form of the quantum uncer-
tainty principle
∆q∆p ≥ ~/2 . (7)
Because all unitary transformations preserve the com-
mutation relations, they also preserve the general form
of the uncertainty relation, Eq. (6). In this article, what
will be relevant are those unitary transformations that
act linearly on the canonical operators. These are the
linear symplectic transformations. Each such transfor-
mation can be represented by a 2n × 2n real matrix A
satisfying
A†ΣA = Σ , (8)
that acts on the canonical operators as
zˆ→ A†zˆ, (9)
where zˆ = (zˆi) is the vector of canonical operators. It
follows that the action of such a symplectic transforma-
tion on the vector of means can be inferred from Eq. (2)
to be simply
d→ A†d , (10)
and it then follows from Eq. (3) that the action on the
covariance matrix is
γ → A†γA . (11)
Because A†ΣA = Σ, the transformed covariance matrix
A†γA also satisfies Eq. (4).
B. Liouville mechanics
Liouville mechanics is the dynamical theory for states
of knowledge about a classical system. A classical sys-
tem is described by a phase space, and the real state of
affairs of a classical system, i.e., its ontic state, corre-
sponds to a point in phase space. Recall that a phase
space is an even-dimensional differentiable manifold M
with a symplectic structure, meaning that it locally ad-
mits coordinates {qi, pi; i = 1, . . . , n} with a Poisson
bracket {qi, pj} = δij [49]. We express these 2n canon-
ical coordinates in the form z2i−1 = qi and zi = pi for
i = 1, . . . , n, and the Poisson bracket in these coordinates
is {zi, zj} = Σij , with Σ defined as above. We use z to
denote the vector of coordinates, defining a point in the
phase space M, i.e., z ∈ M. Systems can be combined
into composite systems, with a phase space given by the
Cartesian product of the phase spaces of the components,
MAB =MA ×MB .
Let L(M) be the space of real-valued functions on the
phase space M, that is, L(M) = {f : M → R}. The
space of functions on a composite system’s phase space
is the tensor product of the space of functions over the
component phase spaces, L(MAB) = L(MA)⊗L(MB),
that is, the closure of the Cartesian product L(MA) ×
L(MB) under linear combinations. A function is non-
negative, f ≥ 0, if f(z) ≥ 0 for all z ∈M. We can define
a norm on the set of functions by
|f | =
∫
M
dz f(z) , f ∈ L(M). (12)
6In a classical theory, any probability distribution on
phase space, sometimes called a Liouville distribution,
represents a possible description of an observer’s knowl-
edge of that system. That is, any Liouville distribution
is a valid epistemic state for the system. The probability
distributions on M are the functions µ that are non-
negative with norm 1. We define this set to be L+(M),
i.e.,
L+(M) = {µ ∈ L(M) s.t. µ ≥ 0, |µ| = 1} . (13)
A Liouville distribution µ ∈ L+(M) is a probabil-
ity distribution (strictly speaking, a probability density),
with which one can define expectation values of func-
tions f on M denoted 〈f〉µ =
∫
M f(z)µ(z)dz. Thus, to
every Liouville distribution µ we assign a set of means
di(µ) = 〈zi〉µ and a covariance matrix
γij(µ) = 2
〈
(zi − di(µ))(zj − dj(µ))
〉
µ
= 2〈zizj〉µ − 2〈zi〉µ〈zj〉µ , (14)
to the canonical coordinates {zi; i = 1, . . . , 2n}. For any
Liouville distribution, the covariance matrix is positive
semidefinite
γ(µ) ≥ 0 . (15)
In the case of a single system in 1 dimension, we have
γ(µ) =
(
2(∆q)2 2 (〈qp〉 − 〈q〉〈p〉)
2 (〈qp〉 − 〈q〉〈p〉) 2(∆p)2
)
. (16)
Eq. (15) yields no restriction on the product of variances
of position and momentum except for the trivial one,
∆q∆p ≥ 0. (17)
It is the i~Σ term that appears in Eq. (4) and that is
absent from Eq. (15) which accounts for the existence of
a restriction on the product of the variances in position
and momentum in quantum theory and the absence of
any such restriction in Liouville mechanics.
III. EPISTEMICALLY-RESTRICTED
LIOUVILLE MECHANICS
A. The epistemic restriction
What we shall consider in this paper is a theory that
can be obtained from Liouville mechanics by adding a
foundational postulate, a restriction on the allowed epis-
temic states (phase-space distributions) within the the-
ory.
Epistemic Restriction. A distribution over phase
space, µ ∈ L+(M), can describe an observer’s knowl-
edge of the ontic state of a physical system if and only if
it satisfies both of the following constraints6:
(a) The classical uncertainty principle (CUP).
The covariance matrix of the distribution, γ(µ),
must satisfy the inequality
γ(µ) + iλΣ ≥ 0 , (18)
where λ > 0 is a free parameter of the theory (with
units of action).
(b) The maximum entropy principle (max-ent).
The distribution µ must have maximum entropy
over the phase space,
S(µ) = −
∫
M
µ(z)logµ(z)dz , (19)
among all possible phase-space distributions with
the same covariance matrix.
If a distribution µ ∈ L+(M) satisfies both the CUP and
the max-ent condition, we say that it is a valid epistemic
state, i.e., µ ∈ Lvalid(M) where Lvalid(M) ⊂ L+(M) is
the set of all valid epistemic states on M.
The CUP is obviously chosen to parallel the quantum
uncertainty principle, Eq. (6), with λ playing the role of
Planck’s constant. For a single system in 1 dimension,
the CUP implies
4(∆q)2(∆p)2 ≥ (〈qˆpˆ+ pˆqˆ〉 − 2〈qˆ〉〈pˆ〉)2 + λ2 , (20)
which in turn implies
∆q∆p ≥ λ/2 , (21)
where variances and expectation values are relative to the
classical distribution over phase space. So we see that the
free parameter λ fixes the minimum product of variances
of position and momentum in our theory. Note that the
presence of the imaginary number i in the CUP does not
imply that we have made some kind of transition from
probability distributions to complex amplitudes; the in-
equality (18) represents a set of inequalities on the real
eigenvalues of the Hermitian matrix γ(µ) + iλΣ and is
therefore simply a compact way of expressing a set of
constraints on the variances and cross-correlations.
There are many distributions µ that have a given set
of mean values of the canonical coordinates, d, and co-
variance matrix γ. The max-ent part of our epistemic
restriction specifies that among these, the only distri-
bution that an agent can assign to a system is the one
that maximizes the entropy of the distribution over the
6 Exceptions to this rule arise if the evidence upon which the ob-
server’s knowledge is conditioned is related to the physical system
in a non-standard way, for instance, from a pair of measurements
on the system, one in the past and the other in the future (pre-
and post-selection) [50]. We discuss this caveat at the end of this
section.
7phase space for this set of mean values and covariance
matrix. According to Jaynes’ max-ent principle [30], this
assumption ensures that an agent should have the maxi-
mum uncertainty about the physical state of the system
consistent with knowing the means and the covariance
matrix. The max-ent constraint is ultimately justified a
posteriori – we assume it because the theory that one de-
rives without it is less analogous to quantum theory. In
particular, while more distributions would be allowed in
a theory that did not assume the max-ent condition, they
have no counterpart in quantum theory. Moreover, these
additional distributions come at a cost, namely, that the
set of allowed measurements is highly proscribed relative
to the theory that does assume the max-ent condition.
See Appendix A for more details.
It can be shown that the set of distributions that sat-
isfy both the CUP and the max-ent condition are multi-
variate Gaussians, given by
µ(z) =
1
(2pi)ndetγ1/2
exp
(
−1
2
(z− d)T γ−1(z− d)
)
,
(22)
where γ is the covariance matrix and d is the vector of
mean values of the coordinates. (The analogy with the
Wigner function will be explored in Sec. IV B 1.) Note
that if γ(µ) is not strictly positive-definite, one is required
to use a pseudoinverse γ−1 in this expression.
The theory of ERL mechanics describes a world that
is classical in its ontology but wherein there is a funda-
mental restriction on experimental operations, that is, a
restriction on what sorts of preparations, measurements
and transformations are possible such that an observer’s
knowledge of a system must always be given by a prob-
ability distribution µ that satisfies the epistemic restric-
tion. Whereas it is often argued that one cannot interpret
the quantum uncertainty principle, Eq. (7), as expressing
a constraint on what one knows about well-defined and
pre-existing values of the position and momentum7, this
is precisely the physical content of the classical uncer-
tainty principle, Eq. (18).
Finally, we emphasize that the epistemic constraint has
implications both for predictions as well as retrodictions
within ERL mechanics, and it is worth taking note of a
subtlety in this regard. In quantum theory, the Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle applies for pure predictions
and pure retrodictions, and not for inferences based on
pre- and post-selection [50]. To see this, consider a se-
quence of three von-Neumann measurements on a com-
pletely mixed state. The first is a position measurement
with outcome q (the pre-selection), the last is a momen-
tum measurement finding outcome p (the post-selection),
and the intermediate measurement is the one whose out-
come is to be estimated. There is no uncertainty relation
7 For this reason, the term indeterminacy relation is sometimes
argued to be preferable to uncertainty relation in the quantum
context.
because there is no trade-off between the certainty one
has about the outcome of an intermediate position mea-
surement and the certainty one has about the outcome of
an intermediate momentum measurement. If the inter-
mediate measurement is of position, then one knows that
its outcome will be q, based on the pre-selection, while if
it is of momentum, then one knows that its outcome will
be p, based on the post-selection. One is certain of the
outcome in both of the counterfactual scenarios. In ERL
mechanics, one can also come to learn both the position
and the momentum of a physical system using pre- and
post-selection. In other words, the epistemic restriction,
like the uncertainty principle in quantum theory, applies
only for pure predictions and pure retrodictions, and not
for inferences based on pre and post-selection.
B. Basic features of ERL mechanics
In this section, we will describe some of the basic fea-
tures of ERL mechanics, with an emphasis on the qual-
itative rather than formal descriptions. In Sec. III C,
we illustrate in detail how several paradigmatic quantum
phenomena are reproduced.
1. Reversible transformations
Every transformation between epistemic states must
be the result of a transformation of the ontic states. The
reason is that we are contemplating a world that obeys
classical dynamics, so that by assumption dynamics cor-
responds to a mapping of the ontic state space to itself.
If an agent lacks knowledge of this dynamics, then they
might describe what they know by a stochastic map, de-
termining a probability distribution over final ontic states
for every initial ontic state. However, if the agent can re-
verse the transformation, then it follows that this map
must be a bijective function over the ontic state space.
The set of reversible transformations on canonical coor-
dinates that are allowed in classical mechanics are the
symplectic transformations [49]. These are precisely the
transformations generated by time evolution under an ar-
bitrary Hamiltonian (that is, one which is an arbitrary
function of the canonical coordinates). Liouville’s Theo-
rem [49] tells us that phase space volumes are preserved
under such symplectic transformations. Thus, in that
any covariance matrix can be viewed as defining a vol-
ume of phase space via an ellipsoid with axes given by
the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, satisfaction of
the CUP is preserved by all symplectic transformations.
That is, if the CUP is satisfied and a symplectic trans-
formation is applied to the system, then it continues to
be satisfied.
In contrast to the CUP, the max-ent condition is only
preserved by a subset of the symplectic transformations,
namely, the linear symplectic transformations. These
are defined as the symplectic transformations that act
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FIG. 1: The reversible transformations within ERL theory
preserve the epistemic constraint. As a result, a transforma-
tion that reduces the uncertainty in both position and mo-
mentum of a Gaussian distribution, as illustrated, is not al-
lowed within ERL mechanics.
linearly on the canonical coordinates. Each such trans-
formation can be represented by a 2n× 2n real matrix A
satisfying A†ΣA = Σ, where Σ is defined in Eq. (1), and
that acts on the symplectic vector space M as
z→ A†z . (23)
The linear symplectic transformations are those that
can be generated by time evolution under a Hamilto-
nian at most quadratic in the canonical coordinates.
These are the only symplectic transformations that pre-
serve the max-ent condition because these are the only
ones that map all Gaussian functions to Gaussian func-
tions. Such transformations correspond to phase-space
displacements, rotations and squeezing. We noted that
any symplectic transformation preserves the CUP, so lin-
ear symplectic transformations must as well. Nonethe-
less, it is illustrative to see a direct proof of this fact. It
suffices to note that a linear symplectic transformation A
induces a transformation of the covariance matrix of the
form γ → AγA†, so that if γ + i~Σ is a positive matrix,
then so is A(γ + i~Σ)A†, and this in turn implies that
AγA† + i~Σ is positive. Fig. 1 illustrates a transforma-
tion on a valid Liouville distribution that is not allowed
within ERL mechanics.
2. Perfect knowledge of quadrature variables
For a single degree of freedom, the classical uncer-
tainty principle states that there is a trade-off between
the degree of certainty an agent can have about each
of two variables in a canonically conjugate pair. One
form of this trade-off is to have perfect knowledge of one
of the variables and no knowledge of the other. Such
states of knowledge form an interesting subset of the
valid epistemic states which correspond in quantum the-
ory to eigenstates of quadrature operators, which are lin-
ear combinations of the position and momentum opera-
tor (strictly speaking, these eigenstates are not normal-
ized vectors in the Hilbert space, but we will not concern
ourselves with these mathematical subtleties). Here, we
show how such states of knowledge can be described and
shown to be consistent with the epistemic constraint.
Consider a Gaussian distribution µ on a phase space
M for a single degree of freedom, with mean position a,
mean momentum b and covariance matrix
γs =
(
2s2 0
0 2λ2s−2
)
, (24)
where s is a real parameter. This covariance matrix
clearly saturates the CUP for all s, and being Gaussian
the distribution is therefore in Lvalid(M). The corre-
sponding epistemic state of the form (22) factorizes into
a Gaussian distribution over q and a Gaussian distribu-
tion over p, i.e.,
µ(q, p) = Ga,s(q)Gb,λs−1(p) , (25)
where Ga,s is a single-variable Gaussian with mean a and
standard deviation s, i.e.,
Ga,s(q) =
1
2
√
pis
exp
(− (q − a)2
4s2
)
, (26)
Gb,λs−1(p) =
1
2
√
piλs−1
exp
(− (p− b)2
4λ2s−2
)
. (27)
Now consider the limit s→ 0. This is the limit where un-
certainty about position vanishes and uncertainty about
momentum diverges. Given that decreasing s corre-
sponds to squeezing the epistemic state along the po-
sition axis, we can also consider the limit s→ 0 to be the
limit of infinite squeezing. In this limit, the position dis-
tribution Ga,s(q) becomes a Dirac delta function δ(q−a)
centred at a,
Ga,s(q)→ δ(q − a) ≡ lim
s→0
1
2
√
pis
exp
(− (q − a)2
4s2
)
, (28)
and the momentum distribution Gb,λs−1 approaches a
uniform distribution. Thus, the epistemic state corre-
sponding to infinite squeezing along position (with mean
position q = a) is the limit s→ 0 of Eq. (25),
µq=a(q, p) = lim
s→0
Ga,s(q)Gb,λs−1(p) ∝ δ(q − a) . (29)
It is the analogue within ERL mechanics of the eigenstate
of the position operator qˆ with eigenvalue a.
By applying a rotation to the phase space, which is a
linear symplectic transformation, we can obtain related
distributions of the form
µqθ=aθ (q, p) ∝ δ(qθ − aθ) , (30)
for any positive aθ where qθ = cos(θ)q + sin(θ)p is an
arbitrary quadrature (the quadrature variables are the
linear combinations of position and momentum). This
distribution corresponds to having perfect knowledge of
the quadrature qθ and no knowledge of the canonically
conjugate quadrature qθ+pi. Because every linear sym-
plectic transformation takes a valid epistemic state to
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FIG. 2: Valid Liouville distributions corresponding to per-
fect knowledge of (a) position, (b) momentum, (c) a general
quadrature.
another valid epistemic state, it follows that all these dis-
tributions are valid. They are the analogues within ERL
mechanics of the eigenstates of the quadrature operators
qˆθ = cos(θ)qˆ + sin(θ)pˆ. See Fig. 2 for an illustration.
For a composite system of n canonical degrees of free-
dom, an argument paralleling the one above shows that
one can have perfect knowledge of all of the canonical
positions and no knowledge of any of the canonical mo-
menta, corresponding to the distribution
µq=a(z) =
n∏
i=1
µqi=ai(qi, pi) , (31)
where z ∈M. Because one can implement a linear sym-
plectic transformation on each component, it is clear that
one can prepare any product of valid epistemic states for
the components. That is, one can have perfect knowledge
of some arbitrary quadrature for each component. But
one can also have correlated epistemic states, as we now
demonstrate.
3. Correlated epistemic states
Given that linear symplectic transformations can mix
the canonical variables of different systems, this allows
states of perfect knowledge of relational and collective
variables. For instance, for a pair of systems A and B
each with a single degree of freedom, the following linear
map is easily shown to be symplectic:
qA → qA − qB , pA → pA − pB ,
qB → qA + qB , pB → pA + pB . (32)
Therefore, by starting with a valid epistemic state for
which one has perfect knowledge of qA and pB , we can
map to a valid epistemic state with perfect knowledge of
the relative position qA − qB and the total momentum
pA + pB while having no knowledge of the canonically
conjugate variables qA + qB and pA − pB .
The particular epistemic state for which the relative
position and total momentum are both known to vanish,
qA − qB = 0 and pA + pB = 0, corresponds to the quan-
tum state described by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen
(EPR) [51], which exhibits maximal entanglement be-
tween the pair of systems. We define a valid epistemic
state with these properties explicitly as the limit of Gaus-
sians that are squeezed along qA − qB and pA + pB ,
µcorrAB (qA, pA, qB , pB)
= lim
s→0
G0,s(qA − qB)G0,λs−1(pA − pB)
×G0,s−1(qA + qB)G0,λs(pA + pB) . (33)
Clearly, this distribution corresponds to knowing that
qA − qB = 0 and pA + pB = 0,
µcorrAB (qA, pA, qB , pB) ∝ δ(qA − qB)δ(pA + pB) . (34)
So we see that maximal bipartite entanglement in ERL
mechanics is modelled by an epistemic state that de-
scribes perfect correlations between the pair of systems.
Such an epistemic state is easily generalized to the
case of two copies of any system. If the system has a
2n-dimensional phase space, and the coordinates of each
subsystem are paired into a set {qiA, piA, qiB , piB ; i =
1, . . . , n}, then the analogue of the EPR state is
µcorrAB (zA, zB) =
n∏
i=1
µcorrAB (qiA, piA, qiB , piB) . (35)
This epistemic state will be useful in our development of
the formalism of ERL mechanics in Section IV A.
4. Variables whose values can be jointly known
Given that linear symplectic transformations keep us
within the space of valid epistemic states, one can have
perfect knowledge of any set of variables that are the
image of the set of canonical positions under a linear
symplectic transformation. To characterize these, recall
that the Poisson bracket between two functions f and g
of the canonical coordinates is
{f, g}PB =
∑
i
(
∂f
∂qi
∂g
∂pi
− ∂f
∂pi
∂g
∂qi
)
. (36)
The set of canonical positions clearly all commute rela-
tive to the Poisson bracket, and no canonical momentum
can be added to this set while maintaining commuta-
tivity. Furthermore, the Poisson bracket is preserved by
symplectic transformations and therefore the sets of vari-
ables for which one can have perfect knowledge in ERL
mechanics are precisely the sets of quadrature variables
that commute relative to the Poisson bracket. This is
the analogue in ERL mechanics of the fact that in quan-
tum theory one can jointly measure a set of observables
if and only if they are commuting relative to the matrix
commutator.
Whereas in quantum mechanics, commutation relative
to the matrix commutator is a criterion for two observ-
ables to be jointly measurable, in ERL mechanics, com-
mutation relative to the Poisson bracket is a criterion for
two variables to be jointly known.
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5. The impossibility of concentrating uncertainty in a
subsystem
Consider the case of a composite system. Although
the epistemic restriction constrains what can be known
about the ontic state of the whole system, it is not im-
mediately obvious whether it also constrains what can
be known about the ontic state of each subsystem. For
instance, given that it is possible to decrease one’s uncer-
tainty about one canonical variable by increasing it for its
canonically conjugate partner, might it also be possible
to decrease one’s uncertainty about a pair of canonically
conjugate variables by increasing it for a different pair of
canonically conjugate variables? As it turns out, this is
not possible, as we now show.
Consider a system consisting of two subsystems A and
B. Let µAB be an epistemic state for the joint system
that satisfies the epistemic restriction. It is then straight-
forward to prove that the marginals of µAB on system A
and B, denoted µA and µB respectively, will also satisfy
the epistemic restriction. First, note that if γAB , γA and
γB denote the covariance matrices of µAB , µA and µB
respectively, then
γAB =
(
γA X
X† γB
)
, (37)
for some matrix X. Note also that ΣAB has the form
ΣAB =
(
ΣA 0
0 ΣB
)
, (38)
where ΣAB , ΣA and ΣB are defined as in Eq. (1) for the
phase spaces of the composite AB, the subsystem A and
the subsystem B respectively.
From the fact that γAB+iλΣAB ≥ 0, we can infer that
γA + iλΣA ≥ 0 and γB + iλΣB ≥ 0 using the following
well-known result from linear algebra ([52], p. 472): for
real matrices a, b, c and d,(
a b
bT c
)
> 0 iff a > 0 and c > bTa−1b . (39)
(This result will be used on many occasions in this article.
Note that the conditions of positive definiteness can be
replaced by conditions of positive semi-definiteness by
continuity for the covariance matrices of Gaussian states
that we consider here.)
Finally, because the marginal of a Gaussian distribu-
tion is also a Gaussian, if µAB satisfies the max-ent con-
dition, then µA and µB do as well.
This result can easily be generalized to any partition of
the symplectic vector space of the whole system into sym-
plectic subspaces, and therefore applies to the marginals
on virtual as well as physical subsystems. For instance,
one cannot achieve certainty about the canonically con-
jugate pair of variables (qA−qB , pA−pB) by concentrat-
ing one’s uncertainty into the canonically conjugate pair
(qA+qB , pA+pB). Note that this result is a special case,
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FIG. 3: A transformation that shuffles uncertainty from one
subsystem to another, as illustrated in (a), is allowed within
ERL mechanics. However, a transformation as illustrated in
(b) that concentrate uncertainty into one subsystem, such
that one can have perfect knowledge of the other, is not al-
lowed within the theory.
applicable only to symplectic vector spaces, of a general
result due to Gromov [53]. For an analysis of the conse-
quences of Gromov’s theorem for uncertainty in Liouville
mechanics, see Refs. [48, 54, 55].
To summarize, Liouville’s theorem only predicts that
one’s uncertainty about an isolated system cannot be
reduced by a symplectic transformation. Therefore, it
leaves open the possibility that this uncertainty can be
partitioned amongst interacting subsystems in such a way
that one is left with no uncertainty about one of them.
However, this possibility is precluded by the result just
described, which may be considered as a strengthening
of Liouville’s theorem. If an observer had access to even
a single system with a phase-space distribution that vi-
olated the CUP, for instance a Gaussian state that sat-
urates the CUP for a value λ′ < λ, then other systems
which initially satisfied the CUP could be made to vi-
olate it by transferring the certainty from the special
system to the system of interest. However, whatever is
the minimum uncertainty for any subsystem initially, λ′
in our example, becomes a lower bound on the uncer-
tainty for any subsystem finally. Uncertainty can never
be “squeezed out” of one subsystem and into another; see
Figure 3. This result is quite reminiscent of Bohr’s de-
fense of the consistency of the uncertainty principle [56],
wherein he appealed to the unavoidable uncertainty in
the initial position and momentum of the apparatus to
show that one could not reduce one’s uncertainty about
the position and momentum of the system8.
8 Bohr presented this defense of the uncertainty principle as part
of his reply to the paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [51].
As we’ll show in Sec. III C 1, ERL mechanics can reproduce the
correlations in the original EPR thought experiment and in-
deed delivers the sort of interpretation of the correlations that
EPR favoured, namely, one wherein position and momentum are
11
6. Measurements of canonical variables
We now consider what the epistemic restriction says
about which measurements can be performed. In partic-
ular, we consider what sorts of canonical variables can be
jointly measured9.
At first glance, it might seem that the epistemic re-
striction could constrain the variables that can be jointly
measured because the latter specify how the epistemic
state of the system ought to be updated as a result of
the measurement. However, specifying which variable is
measured only specifies what one can retrodict about the
ontic state of the system prior to the measurement, and
says nothing about what one can predict about the ontic
state of the system after the measurement. This is anal-
ogous to how, in quantum theory, the observable that is
measured specifies what one can retrodict about the sys-
tem prior to the measurement and says nothing about
how the system updates. The fact that physicists have
focussed upon the von Neumann-Lu¨ders rule (i.e., the
projection postulate) might generate the mistaken im-
pression that the observable being measured does fix how
the quantum state updates. However, there are many
other update rules consistent with a given observable.
For instance, a “measure-and-reprepare” update rule is
one wherein regardless of the observable being measured
and regardless of the measurement’s outcome, some fixed
quantum state is prepared after the measurement. Simi-
larly, in the case of Liouville mechanics, there are many
possible rules for updating the epistemic state for any
given set of variables being measured, in particular, a rule
that prepares a fixed epistemic state after the measure-
jointly well-defined but not jointly known. Even though Bohr
sought to dispute this sort of interpretation in his reply, his de-
scription of the thought experiment makes explicit reference to
the positions and momenta of the systems: “In fact, even if we
knew the position of the diaphragm relative to the space frame
before the first measurement of its momentum, and even though
its position after the last measurement can be accurately fixed,
we lose, on account of the uncontrollable displacement of the di-
aphragm during each collision process with the test bodies, the
knowledge of its position when the particle passed through the
slit.” Indeed, his argument for the consistency of the uncer-
tainty principle makes no reference to the quantum formalism
at all. It reads better as an argument for the consistency of the
uncertainty principle within ERL mechanics. Nonetheless, Bohr
denies the interpretation suggested by ERL mechanics: “we have
in each experimental arrangement suited for the study of proper
quantum phenomena not merely to do with an ignorance of the
value of certain physical quantities, but with the impossibility
of defining these quantities in an unambiguous way.” The only
way we see to reconcile this tension in Bohr’s reply is that Bohr
believed that two quantities can be jointly well-defined only if
they can be jointly measured. In essence, Bohr was a radical
positivist. Otherwise, why from the impossibility of two quan-
tities being jointly measured would he infer the impossibility of
their being jointly well-defined, as opposed to merely inferring
the impossibility of their being jointly known?
9 Our development follows Ref. [57].
ment. Because of the possibility of such an update rule,
the epistemic state after the measurement can always be
made to satisfy the epistemic constraint regardless of the
variables being measured.
Nonetheless, it is possible to constrain the canonical
variables one can jointly measure by considering mea-
surements on one element of a pair of perfectly correlated
systems as described in Sec. III B 3. By assumption, the
ontic dynamics is classical. Therefore, if a measurement
is made on particle A and nothing is done to particle B,
the ontic state of B will not change. However, the epis-
temic state for B may well change as a result of learning
about the ontic state of A (via the measurement’s out-
come) and knowing thatA andB are perfectly correlated.
For instance, if one could jointly measure the values of
position and momentum on system A, then, by virtue of
the fact that A and B are perfectly correlated in position
and perfectly anticorrelated in momentum, one could in-
fer the values of position and momentum on system B.
But this would correspond to having an epistemic state
on B that violates the epistemic restriction, so a joint
measurement of position and momentum must be ruled
out.
More generally, measuring the values of a set of canoni-
cal variables on A implies learning the values of the same
variables (modulo an inversion of the momenta) on B.
We have already seen that the only set of canonical vari-
ables that can be jointly known according to the epis-
temic restriction are those that commute relative to the
Poisson bracket. It is also clear that if a set of variables
on B is obtained by taking the momentum inversion of a
set of variables on A, then the first set commutes relative
to the Poisson bracket if and only if the second does. We
therefore conclude that the only set of canonical variables
that can be jointly measured according to the epistemic
restriction are those that commute relative to the Poisson
bracket.
We have here considered only measurements of canon-
ical variables. No other variables (for instance, nonlin-
ear combinations of canonical variables) can be mea-
sured in ERL mechanics, a claim that we will justify
in Sec. IV A. Furthermore, we have here only consid-
ered measurements wherein the outcomes are determined
uniquely by the phase-space point. The latter are the
analogues of projective measurements in quantum the-
ory. The more general kind of measurement, for which
the outcome is only determined probabilistically by the
phase-space point, is the analogue of a positive operator-
valued measure in quantum theory. We also leave the
characterization of these to Sec. IV A.
7. Transformations induced by measurements of canonical
variables
Finally, we must consider what the epistemic restric-
tion says about how the epistemic state associated with
a system is updated when that system is subjected to
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a measurement. More precisely, given the information
that the measurement has revealed some outcome, and
given the epistemic state describing one’s knowledge of
what the ontic state of the system was at time t, prior to
the measurement, what is the epistemic state describing
one’s knowledge of what the ontic state of the system is
at time t′, after the measurement?10
Consider the case of a quadrature measurement that
is perfectly reproducible, in the sense that if the mea-
surement is repeated in a sequence, with vanishing time
between the measurements (and hence trivial evolution),
the same outcome is always found. Such measurements
are perfectly consistent with the epistemic restriction,
and thus are allowed in ERL mechanics. What we will
show now is that a measurement of one quadrature neces-
sarily induces a completely unknown shift in the canon-
ically conjugate quadrature. That is, we will show the
necessity of a disturbance on the system as a result of
measurement.
For simplicity, let this reproducible measurement be
a measurement of position on a single system. Suppose
that one has perfect knowledge of the momentum of the
system at time t, prior to the measurement. We start
by showing that if there were no disturbance to the mo-
mentum of the system as a result of the measurement
of position, then after the measurement was complete,
one would know both the position and the momentum of
the system. Note first that because the measurement is
assumed to be reproducible, the distribution over posi-
tion at time t′, after the measurement, must be a delta-
function centered at the position revealed by the mea-
surement. Otherwise, there would be some probability
of finding a different position upon repeating the mea-
surement, contrary to the hypothesis of reproducibility.
Consequently, the final (i.e., post-measurement) position
of the system is known based on the outcome of the re-
producible measurement. But note also that under the
hypothesis that the momentum is not disturbed by the
position measurement, one would also know the final
momentum of the system based on one’s knowledge of
its initial momentum and the knowledge that it hasn’t
changed. Thus, no disturbance would imply the possi-
bility of simultaneous knowledge of position and momen-
tum and given that such knowledge is forbidden by the
epistemic constraint it follows that if a measurement of
position is to be possible, it cannot leave the momentum
undisturbed.
Indeed, because the final position is perfectly known,
the epistemic constraint dictates that the final momen-
tum must be completely unknown. But given the as-
sumption that the initial momentum is perfectly known,
it follows that the position measurement must lead to
10 We have been careful in our description of the problem so as not
to confuse two times in the problem: the time at which the agent
assigns a given epistemic state and the time to which the agent’s
knowledge pertains.
a shift in momentum that is drawn uniformly at ran-
dom from among all possible shifts. The same argument
could be run for the measurement of any quadrature,
and so we have reached our desired conclusion: the only
way to maintain the epistemic constraint is if a measure-
ment of one quadrature necessarily induces a completely
unknown shift in the value of the canonically conjugate
quadrature11.
We have shown that if a measurement of a quadrature
variable qθ is performed in a reproducible manner, then
the final epistemic state is the one wherein one has per-
fect knowledge of qθ and no knowledge of qθ+pi. This is
analogous to how, in quantum theory, if a measurement
of the quadrature operator qˆθ is performed in a repro-
ducible manner (i.e., the state updates according to the
projection postulate), then the final quantum state is an
eigenstate of qˆθ. ERL mechanics provides a simple pic-
ture of the projection postulate applied to quadrature ob-
servables. In this view, the collapse describes the change
in an agent’s knowledge of a system. This change is not
merely a Bayesian updating based on acquiring knowl-
edge of the value of a quadrature, but a combination of
such a Bayesian updating followed by a uniform prob-
abilistic mixture of shifts in the canonically conjugate
quadrature.
This unknown disturbance also explains how ERL me-
chanics reproduces the noncommutativity of measure-
ments of canonically conjugate quadratures, that is, the
fact that the statistics of outcomes of consecutive re-
producible measurements of position and momentum de-
pends on the order of the measurements. Consider the
quantum case first. Suppose the initial state is a posi-
tion eigenstate. If the position measurement comes first,
it has a deterministic outcome, while if it comes second,
then it has a probabilistic outcome because the inter-
vening momentum measurement collapses the quantum
state to a momentum eigenstate. Analogously, in ERL
mechanics if the initial epistemic state is one wherein po-
sition is known perfectly, then if a position measurement
comes first, it has a deterministic outcome, while if it
comes second, then it has a probabilistic outcome because
the intervening momentum measurement randomizes the
position of the system.
8. Modeling measurements with deterministic dynamics:
the motility of the cut
The existence of an unknown disturbance might sug-
gest that ERL mechanics presumes an underlying dy-
namics that is objectively stochastic. This is not the
case. To see that the unknown disturbance is consistent
11 This feature of ERL mechanics is reminiscent of the language of
“uncontrollable disturbances” used by Heisenberg and Bohr in
their descriptions of quantum measurements.
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with deterministic dynamics, it is sufficient to consider
the measurement not as an external intervention but as
a dynamical process (as was done for quantum mechanics
by von Neumann [59]). To do so, we imagine that the
measurement couples the system to a probe through an
interaction Hamiltonian H = χqApB , where qA is the po-
sition of the system and pB is the momentum of the probe
and χ is the interaction strength. We imagine that the
free Hamiltonian is negligible compared to the interaction
Hamiltonian for the duration of the measurement. Re-
calling that momentum is the generator of translations,
it follows that this interaction Hamiltonian causes the
probe particle to be shifted by an amount that is pro-
portional to the initial position of the system. Thus, by
measuring the shift in the position of the probe, one can
infer the position of the system. However, in order to be
able to infer the exact value of the shift in position of the
probe, it is necessary that the initial position of the probe
be perfectly known. Consequently, for the apparatus to
achieve a measurement of position, it is necessary that
the epistemic state describing the initial ontic state of the
probe particle be one wherein there is perfect knowledge
of position and complete uncertainty about momentum.
Now note that because position is the generator of
shifts in momentum, the interaction Hamiltonian H =
χqApB also causes the system to have its momentum
shifted by an amount that is proportional to the initial
momentum of the probe. Effectively, while the probe ac-
quires information about the position of the system, the
system acquires information about the momentum of the
probe. This is an instance of the action-reaction princi-
ple of classical mechanics. Given that the initial momen-
tum of the probe is completely unknown (as highlighted
above), it follows that the system suffers a shift in its
momentum which is also completely unknown.
We conclude that the momentum disturbance in a po-
sition measurement is not a result of underlying objective
stochasticity. Rather, the final momentum of the system
is uniquely determined by the initial momentum of the
probe, but by virtue of the complete uncertainty about
the latter, we are left with complete uncertainty about
the former. Effectively, under deterministic dynamics,
our knowledge of the system’s momentum is infected by
our uncertainty about the probe’s.
The other fact that is highlighted by this analysis is
that the predictions of ERL mechanics are insensitive to
the position of the ‘cut’ between what is treated inter-
nally to the theory and what is treated externally. This
is the analogue of von Neumann’s demonstration of the
‘motility of the cut’ in quantum theory [59].
C. Some quantum phenomena reproduced in ERL
mechanics
We have seen how to understand some basic quantum
phenomena by the lights of ERL mechanics, for instance,
the collapse of the wavefunction and noncommutativity
of conjugate measurements. We proceed to consider a
few more examples. Note that when we say that we have
reproduced a quantum phenomena, we are not claiming
that we are necessarily reproducing all quantitative pre-
dictions of quantum theory related to that phenomenon.
Rather, we are claiming that we are reproducing pre-
cisely those aspects of the phenomenon that have been
hitherto considered to rule out any explanation of the
phenomenon in terms of a classical worldview.
1. The EPR thought experiment
Consider the thought experiment proposed by Ein-
stein, Podolsky and Rosen [51]. A pair of particles, de-
noted A and B, are prepared in a quantum state such
that they are correlated in their position along some axis
xˆ. The correlation is described by the EPR entangled
state |Ψcorr〉 = ∫ dqA dqB δ(qA−qB)|qA〉|qB〉. The pair of
particles are distributed to two points that are spatially
separated (along an axis orthogonal to xˆ). If a measure-
ment of position is implemented on A, then the quantum
formalism states that one can immediately predict with
certainty what would be the outcome of a measurement
of position on particle B. Similarly, if a measurement of
momentum is implemented on particle A, then one can
predict with certainty what would be the outcome of a
measurement of momentum on particle B.
EPR point out that if the wavefunction is taken to
be a complete description of reality, then a free choice
made in one region of space will instantaneously effect
the ontic state in another distant region of space. Specif-
ically, the free choice of measurement at particle A deter-
mines whether the wavefunction of particle B becomes an
eigenstate of position or an eigenstate of momentum, and
given that these describe different ontic states under the
assumption that the wavefunction is a complete descrip-
tion of reality, it follows that the free choice effects the
distant reality. EPR took this to be in conflict with the
principle of relativity. On the other hand, EPR argued, if
the wavefunction merely described one’s knowledge of an
underlying reality, then the experiment needn’t be in con-
flict with relativity. As an observer learns the outcome
of the measurement on particle A, they merely update
their knowledge of the ontic state of particle B. ERL
mechanics is precisely the sort of hidden variable model
that allows the EPR experiment to be explained in this
sort of way, as we now demonstrate.
ERL mechanics models the EPR entangled state by a
distribution over the two-particle phase space of the form
µcorrAB (qA, pA, qB , pB) ∝ δ(qA − qB)δ(pA + pB), describing
perfect correlation of the particles’ positions and perfect
anti-correlation of the particles’ momenta. This epis-
temic state was highlighted in Sec. III B 3. The marginal
on the phase space of either particle is the completely
uniform distribution. Consequently, prior to learning the
outcome of the measurement on particle A, an observer
knows nothing of the position or the momentum of parti-
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cle B. If she measures the position of particle A, then by
virtue of knowing that the positions of the two particles
are initially perfectly correlated, she can infer the posi-
tion of particle B. On the other hand, if she measures the
momentum of particle A, then by virtue of knowing that
the momenta of the two particles are initially perfectly
anti-correlated, she can infer the momentum of particle
B. In both cases, particle B has some definite position
and momentum all along that does not change in any way
as a consequence of her measurement on particle A. All
that changes as a result of this measurement is how the
observer refines her knowledge of the ontic state of parti-
cle B. She either refines her knowledge of its position or
she refines her knowledge of its momentum. No “spooky
action at a distance” is required to understand the EPR
experiment if one adopts the interpretation offered by
ERL mechanics.
We emphasize that we are not arguing that a ψ-
epistemic local hidden variable model could explain all
quantum correlations, only that the particular correla-
tions described in the EPR experiment can be so ex-
plained (in precisely the way that EPR suggested they
should). This is not at odds with Bell’s theorem because
the correlations in the EPR experiment do not violate a
Bell inequality. Of course, because it is locally causal by
construction, ERL mechanics cannot hope to reproduce
Bell-inequality violations. Such violations are one of the
quantum phenomena that ERL mechanics emphatically
cannot reproduce, not even qualitatively. The fact that
it is possible to find a local hidden variable model for
the original EPR set-up with measurements restricted to
quadrature observables, is well-known [16, 17, 60].
2. The no-cloning theorem
Imagine one is given a system prepared in an un-
known quantum state |ψ〉. A cloning process is one
which adjoins to the system an ancilla in a fiducial state
|χ〉 and implements the map |ψ〉|χ〉 → |ψ〉|ψ〉 for all
|ψ〉 ∈ H. Given that |ψ〉 is unknown, the map can-
not depend on |ψ〉. No such process exists in quantum
theory[58]. In fact, one cannot even clone a pair of non-
orthogonal states. That is, if the system is prepared in
a quantum state drawn from the set {|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉}, where
0 < |〈ψ1|ψ2〉| < 1, then no process can implement the
map
|ψk〉|χ〉 → |ψk〉|ψk〉 for k ∈ {1, 2}. (40)
The proof is as follows. Unitary dynamics preserves in-
ner products, so if a process is to be implemented by a
unitary, it must preserve inner products. In the cloning
process, the magnitude of the inner product between the
two possible initial states is
|(〈ψ1|〈χ|)(|ψ2〉|χ〉)| = |〈ψ1|ψ2〉| (41)
while the inner product between the two possible final
states is
|(〈ψ1|〈ψ1|)(|ψ2〉|ψ2〉)| = |〈ψ1|ψ2〉|2. (42)
Thus, the magnitude of the inner product is preserved
only if |〈ψ1|ψ2〉| = 0 or 1, which implies that the two
states are orthogonal or collinear. Irreversible quantum
operations will not help because they necessarily lead to
an increase in the quantum fidelity, while a cloning pro-
cess requires a decrease in this fidelity.
If one takes an ontic view of quantum states, then
given that classically the ontic state of a system can al-
ways be measured and then copied, it would appear that
no-cloning is a nonclassical phenomenon. By contrast, if
one adopts an epistemic view of quantum states, then the
cloning process is properly understood as a process which
clones the applicability of a given state of knowledge and
it is seen to occur even classically. We present the ana-
logue of the no-cloning of two non-orthogonal quantum
states. Suppose that we are told that a system has been
prepared by sampling its ontic state z from the distribu-
tion µ1(z) or from the distribution µ2(z). Suppose that
µ1(z) and µ2(z) are nondisjoint, that is, they overlap in
some part of the phase space, µ1(z)µ2(z) 6= 0 for some z.
A cloning process is one which adjoins to the system an
ancilla (with the same ontic state space as the system)
prepared in a fiducial epistemic state ν(z′) and trans-
forms the ontic state in such a way that the following
map over epistemic states is induced:
µk(z)ν(z
′)→ µk(z)µk(z′) for k ∈ {1, 2}. (43)
To see that this cloning process is impossible, we first de-
fine the classical fidelity between distributions µ1(z) and
µ2(z) as
∫
dz
√
µ1(z)
√
µ2(z); it is 0 if the distributions
are disjoint and 1 if they are identical (the analogy to the
magnitude of the inner product between quantum states
should be clear). It then suffices to note that a pair of
distributions can encode a bit of information and that the
classical fidelity between the distributions is a measure of
their indistinguishability. Given that the amount of infor-
mation in an encoding cannot be increased by processing
(this is the content of the data processing inequality), it
should not be possible to increase their distinguishability,
i.e. it should not be possible to decrease the fidelity by
any processing. At best, one can preserve it. Let us con-
sider what this constraint implies. The classical fidelity
between the two possible initial states is
∫
dz dz′
√
µ1(z)ν(z′)
√
µ2(z)ν(z′)
=
∫
dz
√
µ1(z)
√
µ2(z) , (44)
where we have used the fact that
∫
dz′ ν(z′) = 1, whereas
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between the two possible final epistemic states it is∫
dz dz′
√
µ1(z)µ1(z′)
√
µ2(z)µ2(z′)
=
(∫
dz
√
µ1(z)
√
µ2(z)
)2
. (45)
For the classical fidelity to be preserved, we require∫
dz
√
µ1(z)
√
µ2(z) =
(∫
dz
√
µ1(z)
√
µ2(z)
)2
,
(46)
which implies that
∫
dz
√
µ1(z)
√
µ2(z) = 0 or 1, or
equivalently, that µ1(z)µ2(z) = 0 or µ1(z) = µ2(z).
Thus, a pair of epistemic states can be cloned if and only
they are disjoint or identical.
Note that the proof proceeds in direct analogy with
the quantum proof, where the role of orthogonality and
Hilbert space inner product are played by disjointness
and classical fidelity respectively. That there is a no-
cloning theorem for non-disjoint probability distributions
has also been noted in Refs. [2, 37, 38, 61] 12.
We have yet to specify in which sense the epistemic
restriction is necessary to properly model the quantum
no-cloning theorem. We have seen that by simply defin-
ing cloning in terms of epistemic states rather than ontic
states, one finds that certain pairs of epistemic states
–nondisjoint ones– cannot be cloned. However, in Liou-
ville mechanics (without the epistemic restriction) only
mixed epistemic states can be nondisjoint; the pure epis-
temic states are point distributions over the phase space
and can be cloned. On the other hand, in ERL mechan-
ics, the pure epistemic states (defined as those that are
extremal in the convex set of epistemic states) are them-
selves states of incomplete knowledge and can be nondis-
joint. It follows that only in ERL mechanics does one
have an analogue of no-cloning for sets of pure quantum
states.
There is one other sense in which the epistemic re-
striction is important for emulating all the limitations
on cloning that are seen in quantum theory. Although
in quantum theory it is impossible to have pure states
as marginals without the state of the composite being a
product state, one might wonder whether, in the context
of ERL mechanics we could achieve a joint distribution
12 A similar point can be made about the phenomenon of quantum
chaos. Many researchers have been puzzled by the apparent dif-
ferences between the classical and quantum signatures of chaos.
While classical states of an isolated system can exponentially di-
verge under Hamiltonian chaotic evolution, quantum states of an
isolated system cannot because the inner product between two
quantum states is invariant under unitary evolution. However,
the analogy between quantum states and Liouville distributions
suggests that the quantum inner product should not be compared
with the distance in phase space but rather with the overlap of
the Liouville densities. One can then reconcile the signatures of
classical and quantum chaos [34, 35, 62].
over the composite system that has µk(z) as the marginal
distribution for both subsystems but with the possibility
of correlations between the systems. We did not con-
sider this possibility above, where we required the final
distribution to be a product distribution. Such a pro-
cess would be a classical broadcasting map. As it turns
out, the data processing inequality does not exclude this
possibility. Indeed, if it were not for the epistemic re-
striction, such a map could be realized. One could mea-
sure the ontic state z of the system, prepare the target
in the same ontic state, then forget the outcome of the
measurement. But such a measurement would violate
the epistemic restriction, so this strategy will not work.
Alternatively, one could simply implement the determin-
istic dynamics (z, z′) → (z, z) on the pair of systems.
This would achieve broadcasting regardless of the value
of z′, but it is not allowed because it does not preserve
the Poisson bracket and hence is not Hamiltonian. Fi-
nally, there are Hamiltonian maps that can implement
broadcasting for one particular value of z′, but given the
epistemic restriction, one cannot have such knowledge of
z′.
3. Teleportation
We begin by providing the quantum description of
teleportation for continuous variable systems. The sce-
nario is similar to that of the EPR experiment. A pair
of particles are prepared in the EPR entangled state
|Ψcorr〉 = ∫ dqA dqB δ(qA − qB)|qA〉|qB〉, that is, corre-
lated in their position along the xˆ-axis, and distributed
to Alice and Bob, who are presumed to be spatially sepa-
rated (along an axis orthogonal to xˆ). We assume trivial
dynamics so that we can neglect dispersion over time. A
third party, Victor, prepares another particle, denoted V ,
in the quantum state |ψ〉, (again, describing the position
of the particle along the xˆ-axis) and passes it to Alice.
The identity of particle V ’s quantum state is unknown
to Alice and Bob. Their task is to implement a protocol
that leaves particle B in the quantum state |ψ〉. The ini-
tial quantum state of the triple of particles is |ψ〉|Ψcorr〉.
This initial state can be rewritten (preserving the order
of the Hilbert spaces) as
1
2pi~
∫
dadb (Da,b ⊗ I)|Ψcorr〉D†a,b|ψ〉 , (47)
where Da,b = exp(− i~ (apˆ − bqˆ)) is the unitary operator
that corresponds to a displacement in phase space by the
vector (a, b).
Note that the state of particles V and A appearing in
the a, b term in this decomposition is simply the joint
eigenstate of the commuting pair of operators qˆV − qˆA
and pˆV + pˆA associated with eigenvalues a and b. Conse-
quently, if Alice measures qˆV −qˆA and pˆV +pˆA on the pair
of particles in her possession, and obtains outcomes a and
b respectively, then (assuming the projection postulate as
the collapse rule) the total quantum state is updated to
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just one of the terms in the integrand. Alice’s two parti-
cles have been left in a maximally entangled state (a local
phase space displacement of the EPR state), and Bob’s
particle has been left in the state D†a,b|ψ〉. Therefore, to
complete the protocol, Alice need only communicate a, b
to Bob, who then applies the unitary Da,b to his particle
and leaves it in the state |ψ〉, as required. The protocol
succeeds regardless of the identity of |ψ〉, so Alice and
Bob need not know its identity. Finally, note that if par-
ticle V is entangled with another particle, say particle C,
then the quantum state of the composite of particles V
and C is transferred to the composite of particles B and
C, a phenomenon known as entanglement swapping.
What is surprising about continuous variable telepor-
tation, if one takes the view that quantum states are on-
tic, is that while it takes an infinite number of complex
parameters to completely specify the quantum state, this
state can be transferred from Alice to Bob by communi-
cating only two real numbers. Even if we restrict the
unknown quantum state to be a Gaussian state, we still
require five parameters to describe it (specifically, two for
specifying the mean position and mean momentum and
three for specifying the covariance matrix) but only two
to transfer it. On the other hand, if one takes the view
that quantum states are epistemic, then teleportation is
a protocol wherein someone’s knowledge about a system
becomes applicable to another system and, as we shall
see, such a transfer can be achieved with only two real
parameters.
If Alice could jointly measure the position and mo-
mentum of particle V , she could simply communicate
this information to Bob who could then prepare particle
B with that precise position and momentum (this is es-
sentially how teleportation is imagined to occur on Star
Trek). In this way, whatever Victor knew about particle
V would now pertain to particle B. However, the epis-
temic constraint forbids such a joint measurement. The
magic of the teleportation protocol, by the lights of ERL
mechanics, is that it provides a way of transferring the
applicability of Victor’s knowledge in spite of the epis-
temic constraint.
Teleportation of Gaussian states can be modeled in
ERL mechanics as follows13. The pair of particles shared
by Alice and Bob are prepared in the epistemic state
µcorrAB (qA, pA, qB , pB) ∝ δ(qA − qB)δ(pA + pB) (the model
of the EPR state), which corresponds to knowing the rel-
ative position of the two particles to be qB − qA = 0 and
the total momentum to be pB + pA = 0, which is to say
that they are known to have the same position and oppo-
site momenta. Alice makes a measurement on particles
V and A, both in her possession. Specifically, she mea-
sures the relative position, qV − qA, and the sum of their
momenta, pV + pA. (This is allowed by the epistemic
13 The discussion provided here closely parallels the one provided
in Ref. [2]; see also [63].
restriction because these variables have commuting Pois-
son bracket). Combining this new data with her previ-
ous knowledge, Alice can infer what the relative position
qV − qB and relative momentum pV − pB of particles V
and B were prior to the measurement (because this is an
inference based on pre and post selection of the triple of
particles, the epistemic constraint need not apply, as dis-
cussed in Sec. III A). Specifically, if Alice finds through
her measurement that qV −qA = a and pV +pA = b, then
she infers that qV − qB = (qV − qA)− (qA − qB) = a and
that pV − pB = (pV + pA) − (pA + pB) = b. Given that
the measurement is implemented on particles V and A,
it will not disturb the ontic state of particle B, so that
the ontic state of particle B after the measurement is
precisely what it was prior to the measurement, namely,
qB = qV − a and pB = pV − b. So Alice simply tells Bob
to shift the position of particle B by a and its momentum
by b, so that it will come to have the same position and
momentum as particle V had before the measurement. In
this way, whatever Victor knew about the ontic state of
particle V prior to the measurement now pertains to the
ontic state of particle B after the measurement. Mean-
while, because particles V and A have undergone a mea-
surement, there is an unknown disturbance to these, and
consequently Victor’s knowledge is no longer applicable
to particle V (which is why teleportation is not in con-
flict with no-cloning). Had Victor initially known particle
V to have a particular correlation with particle C, then
at the end of the protocol, he would judge particle B to
have this correlation with particle C, and so we also have
a model of entanglement swapping for Gaussian states.
A formalized presentation of this entanglement swapping
relation is given as Lemma 4 in Sec. IV A.
The reason that Alice can get away with communicat-
ing only two real parameters to Bob is that this amount of
communication is sufficient (in the context of the telepor-
tation protocol) for Bob to be able to prepare his particle
in the ontic state that initially described the particle sup-
plied by Victor. Once this is done, whatever knowledge
Victor had of his particle’s original ontic state, it now
applies to Bob’s particle, regardless of how many param-
eters are required to specify Victor’s state of knowledge.
Note furthermore that the transfer of the applicability of
Victor’s state of knowledge does not, strictly speaking,
require any communication from Alice to Bob. Suppose
Alice only sends the outcome of her measurement to Vic-
tor, and not to Bob, so that Bob never does any correc-
tion operation on his particle. Then, in the special case
where Alice’s measurement finds particles V and A to
have had the same position and momentum, Victor can
still conclude that whatever knowledge he initially had
of his particle now pertains to Bob’s particle.
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IV. OPERATIONAL EQUIVALENCE OF ERL
MECHANICS AND GAUSSIAN QUANTUM
MECHANICS
Having described some of the basic features of ERL
mechanics, we will proceed to provide a complete oper-
ational formulation of the theory in Sec. IV A. We will
then provide an operational formulation of a subtheory
of quantum mechanics which we call Gaussian quantum
mechanics in Sec. IV B. Finally, in Sec. IV C, we prove
the main result of this article:
Theorem 1 (Equivalence) Gaussian quantum me-
chanics is operationally equivalent to ERL mechanics
with λ = ~.
A few definitions are required to make sense of this re-
sult. An operational formulation of a theory is one which
only specifies what are the possible preparations, trans-
formations and measurements according to the theory, as
well as a rule for computing the probability of the out-
come of every measurement when performed on a given
preparation followed by a given transformation. An op-
erational formulation of a theory needn’t make any refer-
ence to ontological structure. Two theories that are for-
mulated operationally are said to be operationally equiv-
alent if there is a one-to-one mapping between the prepa-
rations, measurements and transformations that are al-
lowed in the first theory and those that are allowed in
the second, and if the statistics predicted for every possi-
ble experiment in the first theory are precisely the same
as those predicted for the corresponding experiment in
the second theory. Finally, a subtheory of an opera-
tional theory is what one obtains by allowing only a sub-
set of the preparations, transformations and measure-
ments that are allowed in the parent theory. Gaussian
quantum mechanics is the subtheory of quantum me-
chanics wherein the allowed preparations, measurements
and transformations are those for which the associated
Wigner representations are Gaussian functions.
A. Operational formulation of ERL mechanics
The most general preparation in ERL mechanics is rep-
resented by a phase-space distribution. We have already
specified, in Sec. III, which distributions satisfy the epis-
temic restriction. They are denoted µ ∈ Lvalid(M) on a
phase spaceM. Consequently, we have already specified
the set of possible preparation procedures. It therefore
suffices to characterize the set of possible transformations
and measurements.
1. General measurements
In Sec. III B 6, we described which canonical variables
could be measured jointly on a system. However, Liou-
ville mechanics admits a more general form of measure-
ment wherein the ontic state does not determine the out-
come deterministically but only fixes the relative prob-
abilities of various outcomes. This occurs whenever the
outcome of the measurement depends on other degrees of
freedom besides the system of interest and the states of
these are not completely known. For example, consider a
system consisting of a single canonical degree of freedom.
If it interacts with several ancillas via a quadratic Hamil-
tonian and measurements of quadrature variables are im-
plemented upon the ancillas, the resulting measurement
on the system will not in general yield full information
about a singe quadrature, but rather will yield partial
information about each of a pair of canonically conju-
gate quadratures. As another example, if the system
interacts with an auxiliary system that is subsequently
ignored, the effective measurement on the system is not
maximally informative (these sorts of measurements are
in fact generic, because the ability to avoid all such noise
is always an idealization within classical mechanics).
The most general sort of measurement, which incorpo-
rates both the deterministic and probabilistic varieties, is
associated with a set of indicator functions on the phase
space M, that is, a set {ξy(z)} where ξy(z)dy is the
probability of obtaining a measurement outcome within
dy of y given that the ontic state of the system is z. The
variable y labels elements of the outcome space of he
measurement. For instance, a measurement of position
is associated with a set of indicator functions labeled by
a position variable q0, specifically, {ξq(z) ∝ δ(q − q0)}.
For general measurements, the outcome space may be
higher-dimensional. Because ξy(z) is a probability den-
sity, we have ξy(z)dy ≥ 0, and because some outcome is
certain to occur, we have
∫
dyξy(z) = 1 for all z. Clearly,
if the system is described by the epistemic state µ and a
measurement described by the set of indicator functions
{ξy} is performed, the probability density for outcome y
is
p(y) =
∫
dz ξy(z)µ(z) . (48)
We now consider what constraints on the indicator
functions follow from the epistemic restriction.
As discussed in Sec. III B 6, the way to infer these con-
straints is by imagining the measurement to be performed
on a system A that is correlated with another system B,
and applying the epistemic restriction to the final distri-
bution assigned to B. Specifically, we require that a valid
indicator function acting on a system MA must always
result in a valid epistemic state on MB when applied to
any (possibly correlated) epistemic state on MA ×MB .
This implies the following constraint.
Proposition 2 (Valid indicator functions) An indi-
cator function on M is valid if and only if, when nor-
malized, it satisfies the epistemic constraint, that is,
ξ is valid iff
ξ
|ξ| ∈ Lvalid(M) . (49)
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Proof. First we prove necessity. If A and B are pre-
pared in the perfectly-correlated state µcorrAB and a mea-
surement on A yields the outcome associated with the
indicator function ξA, then by Bayes’ theorem, one up-
dates the description of AB to µ′AB ∝ ξAµcorrAB . Given
that µcorrAB describes perfect correlation for position and
anti-correlation for momentum (see Eq. (34)), it follows
that the marginal on B is µ′B(z) ∝ ξA(Λz), where Λ in-
dicates momentum inversion, Λ ≡ diag(1,−1, 1,−1, . . . )
(or equivalently, time inversion). Thus, ξA(z) is a valid
indicator function only if ξA(Γz)/|ξA(Γz)| is a valid state.
If a distribution is positive and satisfies the CUP, then
so does its momentum inversion, consequently, it suffices
to require that ξA(z)/|ξA(z)| is a valid state.
To prove sufficiency, we show that any Gaussian indi-
cator function acting on system A of any bipartite state
µAB ∈ Lvalid(MA×MB) yields a valid updated state on
B. We follow a similar proof to that found in Ref. [64].
Consider a measurement described by a Gaussian indi-
cator function on A with covariance matrix γ′A, on a bi-
partite Gaussian state µAB ∈ Lvalid(MA × MB) with
covariance matrix γAB . For clarity, we will assume these
covariance matrices are both strictly positive-definite. (A
general proof for positive semi-definite matrices follows
by appropriately using a pseudoinverse.) It is convenient
to partition the matrix γAB as
γAB =
(
γA X
XT γB
)
, (50)
so as to respect the division of the joint state into sub-
systems A and B.
The post measurement state µ′B on system B is found
from the the probability distribution µAB by conditional-
izing on ξA having been found on A and marginalization
on A in the standard manner. We make use of the fact
that Gaussian integrals performed over a subset of the
variables concerned yields a Gaussian in terms of the re-
maining variables. For our case, the relevant Gaussian
distribution over B has a covariance matrix given by the
Schur complement [64]
γ′B = γB −XT (γ′A + γA)−1X . (51)
We now need to confirm that γ′B satisfies the classical
uncertainty relation. Given that γAB and γ
′
A satisfy the
CUP, we have the relations
γAB + iλΣAB ≥ 0 , (52)
γ′A − iλΣA ≥ 0 . (53)
where in the second expression we have taken the com-
plex conjugation of the usual expression. Adding these
two equations yields(
γA + γ
′
A X
XT γB + iλΣB
)
≥ 0 . (54)
Applying the result from linear algebra described in
Eq. (39) and making use of Eq. (51), we find
γ′B + iλΣB ≥ 0 . (55)
We note that, as a result of this theorem, the indicator
function
ξcorr ∝ µcorr , (56)
is a valid indicator function on M×M.
The valid sets of indicator functions {ξy(z)} are simply
those consisting entirely of valid indicator functions such
that
∫
dyξy(z) = 1 for all z. For example, if we take
any valid indicator function with means at the origin of
the phase space and consider the set obtained by acting
all phase-space displacements on the latter, we obtain a
valid set of indicator functions where the outcome of the
measurement is labeled by a point in phase space. We
will denote elements of a general outcome space by y.
2. General transformations
In Sec. III B 1, we demonstrated that the valid re-
versible transformations within ERL mechanics were the
linear symplectic transformations. However, a general
operational theory includes non-reversible transforma-
tions as well. These can include dissipation due to cou-
pling to another system (and subsequently marginaliz-
ing over that system), transformations due to a measure-
ment being performed on the system, and irreversibility
due to an agent lacking knowledge of which reversible
transformation was implemented. We now consider how
such general transformations are described within ERL
mechanics, and what constraints are forced upon these
transformations by the epistemic restriction.
Recall that, by assumption, the dynamics is classical,
but an observer might lack knowledge of the nature of the
dynamics (for instance, if the environment with which the
system is interacting is in an unknown physical state). In
this case, they assign a probability distribution over the
possibilities for the dynamics. Such ignorance can always
be characterized by a probability distribution over the fi-
nal ontic states for every initial ontic state, that is, by
a set of transition probabilities η(z′A|zA) describing the
probability that the system will evolve to z′A given that
it started in state zA. Clearly, we require η(z
′
A|zA) ≥ 0
for all zA, zA′ , and
∫
dz′Aη(z
′
A|zA) = 1 for all zA. If
an agent’s knowledge of the dynamics is described by
η(z′A|zA), and their knowledge of the initial state is de-
scribed by the epistemic state µ(zA), then their knowl-
edge of the final state will be described by the epistemic
state
µ′(z′A) =
∫
dzAη(z
′
A|zA)µ(zA). (57)
We can also represent the transformation of the agent’s
knowledge by a transfer functional, that is, a linear map
over functions on phase space ΓA : L(MA) → L(MA),
specifically,
ΓA[f ](z
′
A) =
∫
dzA η(z
′
A|zA)f(zA) . (58)
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This map is norm-preserving, that is, it satisfies |ΓA[f ]| =
|f |, for all functions f ∈ L(MA). It is also positivity-
preserving, which is to say that if f ∈ L+(MA) then
ΓA[f ] ∈ L+(MA′)).
The question is: which transition probabilities, or
equivalently, which transfer functionals are valid within
ERL mechanics?
A necessary condition on the set of valid transforma-
tions on a system is that, viewed as transfer function-
als, they must take valid epistemic states on the system
to valid epistemic states, that is, they must be validity-
preserving. But it is also necessary that when acting on
part of a larger system, they also take valid epistemic
states on that larger system to valid epistemic states; we
say that they are completely validity-preserving or CVP
(in analogy with the property of maps in quantum the-
ory of being completely positivity-preserving). Thus, we
require that if
µAB(zA, zB) ∈ Lvalid(MA ×MB) , (59)
then∫
dzA η(z
′
A|zA)µAB(zA, zB) ∈ Lvalid(MA ×MB) .
(60)
Defining the identity transfer functional id : M → M
by id[f ] = f , we can express the condition of a transfer
functional ΓA being CVP compactly as
(ΓA ⊗ idB)[µAB ] ∈ Lvalid(MA′ ×MB) . (61)
The other condition that a transformation must satisfy
in order to be considered valid is that it must supervene
on valid ontic dynamics – either the transformation cor-
responds to linear symplectic evolution on the system’s
phase space (the reversible case) or it must correspond to
adjoining to the system an ancillary system prepared ac-
cording to a valid epistemic state, coupling the pair via
a linear symplectic evolution on the joint phase space,
and then marginalizing over the ancillary system. If this
condition holds, we say that the transformation satisfies
ontic supervenience.
To see why this condition is important, it suffices to
note that a transformation may be validity-preserving
but not satisfy the ontic supervenience property. Mo-
mentum reversal (or equivalently, time reversal) is such
a transformation. It is defined by the conditional
η(z′A|zA) = δq′A,qAδp′A,−pA , which corresponds to the de-
terministic map q′A = qA and p
′
A = −pA. This can-
not arise as a symplectic transformation on the system
because the Poisson bracket is not preserved. Further-
more, although one could conceive of implementing this
map by measuring both the position and the momentum
and then re-preparing the system with an inverted mo-
mentum, such a measurement is forbidden in the theory.
So, while momentum reversal takes every valid epistemic
state to a valid epistemic state, it does not satisfy ontic
supervenience.14
Nonetheless, we will show that every transformation
that is completely validity-preserving satisfies the ontic
supervenience property and so is a valid transformation.
We will also show that one can characterize the set
of valid transformations by their action on the perfectly
correlated state.
Proposition 3 (Valid transformations) A transfor-
mation on a system is valid if and only if the bipartite
epistemic state one obtains by acting it on half of a per-
fectly correlated state of a pair of such systems is valid.
In other words, if ΓA denotes the transfer functional on
L(MA), µcorrAB denotes the perfectly correlated state on a
pair of identical systems MA ×MB, and
µΓAB ≡ (ΓA ⊗ idB)[µcorrAB ] . (62)
then ΓA is valid if and only if µ
Γ
AB ∈ Lvalid(MA×MB).
Note that µΓAB has the same marginal on B as µ
corr
AB ,
that is, a uniform marginal. Therefore, the valid transfer
functionals on A are in one-to-one correspondence with
the valid epistemic states on a pair of copies of A that
have a uniform marginal on one of the copies. We shall
say simply that the valid transformations are isomorphic
to valid bipartite states. This isomorphism is the anal-
ogy within ERL mechanics of the Choi isomorphism in
quantum theory.
The rest of the section will seek to prove these re-
sults. The strategy of the proof is to demonstrate (i) that
a transfer functional is completely validity-preserving if
and only if it is isomorphic to a valid bipartite state, and
(ii) that a transfer functional satisfies the ontic superve-
nience property if and only if it is isomorphic to a valid
bipartite state. Together, these two facts imply that ev-
ery transformation that is completely validity-preserving
satisfies the ontic supervenience property. Therefore,
the condition of being completely validity-preserving is
not only necessary for a transformation to be valid but
sufficient as well (unlike the condition of being validity-
preserving, which is not sufficient). Given this character-
ization of the valid transformations, proposition 3 then
follows from (i).
We begin by establishing the connection between the
CVP property and the isomorphism property. To do so,
it is useful to note a general analogue of quantum tele-
portation (and entanglement swapping) within ERL me-
chanics (formalizing the discussion in Sec. III C 3). We
14 In the context of the Spekkens toy theory, the “universal state
inverter” transformation, which takes every epistemic state of a
single elementary system to the epistemic state that has disjoint
support with it, is an example of a transformation that is validity-
preserving but does not supervene on the ontic dynamics, as
discussed in Sec. III.C of Ref. [2]. If one tries to supplement
the toy theory with such transformations, as is considered in
Ref. [65], one is left with a theory that no longer admits of a
straightforward realist interpretation.
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begin by defining a functional that represents marginal-
izing over MA, namely, TrA : MA → R defined by
TrA[f ] =
∫
dzAf(zA) = |f | (the notation is chosen to be
suggestive of the analogous quantum trace operation).
Lemma 4 (Teleportation) Any epistemic state µAB
on MA ×MB satisfies the relation
µAB ∝ TrCD[ξcorrCD µcorrAC µDB ] , (63)
where C,D are ancillary systems identical to A, and
ξ corrCD ∝ µcorrCD is the indicator function associated with
the maximally-correlated state.
Proof. We make use of the explicit expression for µcorr
given in Eqs. (33-35), and the proportionality ξcorr ∝
µcorr, to obtain
TrCD[ξ
corr
CD µ
corr
AC µDB ]
∝
∏
i
∫
dqiC dpiC dqiD dpiD
× δ(qiC − qiD)δ(piC + piD)δ(qiA − qiC)
× δ(piA + piD)µDB(zD, zB)
∝ µAB(zA, zB) , (64)
We can now prove the first lemma concerning valid
transformations.
Lemma 5 (CVP and isomorphism) A transforma-
tion on a system is completely validity-preserving if and
only if the bipartite epistemic state one obtains by acting
it on half of a perfectly correlated pair of such systems is
valid.
Proof. Necessity is trivial to prove. If a transfer func-
tion ΓA is CVP, then it maps all valid epistemic states
on MA ×MB to valid epistemic states on MA ×MB .
Because µcorrAB is a valid epistemic state on MA ×MB ,
then µΓAB = (ΓA ⊗ idB)[µcorrAB ] is as well.
To prove sufficiency, we must show that any ΓA satis-
fying
(ΓA ⊗ idB)[µcorrAB ] ∈ Lvalid(MA ×MB) , (65)
also satisfies (ΓA⊗ idB)[µAB ] ∈ Lvalid(MA×MB) for all
µAB ∈ Lvalid(MA ×MB).
Using Lemma 4, we now calculate the action of (ΓA ⊗
idB) on an arbitrary state µAB ∈ Lvalid(MA ×MB).
(ΓA ⊗ idB)[µAB ]
=
[
(ΓA ⊗ TrCD ⊗ idB)[ξcorrCD µcorrAC µDB ]
]
=
[
(idA ⊗ TrCD ⊗ idB)[ξcorrCD µΓACµDB ]
]
. (66)
Because µΓACµDB is a valid epistemic state (being a prod-
uct of two valid epistemic states) and because ξcorrCD is a
valid indicator function, the result is a valid epistemic
state.
Next, we need to establish that a transformation sat-
isfies the ontic supervenience property if and only if it is
isomorphic to a valid bipartite state. We begin by char-
acterizing what the ontic supervenience property implies
about how the transformation acts on the covariance ma-
trix.
Lemma 6 A transformation on A satisfies the ontic su-
pervenience property (i.e. it can be realized by coupling
to an environment via a joint linear symplectic trans-
formation followed by marginalization) if and only if the
covariance matrix on A transforms as
γA 7→ XT γAX + Y , (67)
for real matrices X,Y that satisfy
Y ≥ iΣA − iXTΣAX . (68)
This result follows in a straightforward manner from
previous work on unitary dilations of Gaussian quantum
channels [66]. Nonetheless, for clarity, we repeat some of
the details of the proof here.
Proof. Consider necessity first. We begin by describ-
ing how transformations that satisfy the ontic superve-
nience property act on the covariance matrix. Consider
a system A, and a valid epistemic state µA with covari-
ance matrix γA, initially uncorrelated with an environ-
ment E, described by a valid epistemic state µE and
covariance matrix γE . Because they are initially uncor-
related, the covariance matrix of the joint system AE is
γAE = diag(γA, γE). The pair of systems is then acted
upon by a linear symplectic transformation S on the joint
phase space AE, describing a general reversible transfor-
mation. This matrix can be expressed in block form as
S =
(
SAA SAE
SEA SEE
)
, (69)
and satisfies STΣAES = ΣAE . The covariance matrix
γ′AE for the joint system after this transformation is
given by γ′AE = S
T γAES. Considering only the resulting
marginal distribution µ′A on the system after the trans-
formation (marginalizing over the environment), the re-
sulting covariance matrix γ′A of µ
′
A is
γ′A = S
T
AAγASAA + S
T
EAγESEA . (70)
Note that, because µA and µE are both valid epistemic
states, and we applied valid operations (a reversible linear
symplectic transformation, and a marginalization), then
the final marginal µ′A will be valid, i.e., γ
′
A + iΣA ≥ 0.
Eq. (70) shows that the covariance matrix transforms as
Eq. (67) prescribes, with X = SAA and Y = S
T
EAγESEA.
These are both real matrices, but it remains to show that
they satisfy Eq. (68).
Because γE + iΣE ≥ 0 it follows that
STEA (γE + iΣE)SEA ≥ 0. (71)
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Using the fact that SΣST = Σ, where Σ =
diag (ΣA,ΣE) , we infer that S
T
AAΣASAA+S
T
EAΣESEA =
Σ. Substituting this into Eq. (71), we have
STEAγESEA + i
(
Σ− STAAΣASAA
) ≥ 0.
In other words,
Y ≥ −iΣA + iXTΣAX,
from which Eq. (68) can be obtained by taking the com-
plex conjugate.
To prove sufficiency, one must show that it is possible
to find a symplectic matrix S and a covariance matrix
γE leading to any X and Y that satisfy Y ≥ iΣA −
iXTΣAX. The construction is somewhat involved, so we
do not repeat it here, but simply refer the reader to [66].
Having characterized the transformations that satisfy
the ontic supervenience property by how they act on
the covariance matrix, we now demonstrate that all such
transformations are isomorphic to a valid bipartite state.
Lemma 7 A transformation acts on covariance matrices
in the manner described in lemma 6 if and only if the
bipartite epistemic state one obtains by acting it on half
of the perfectly correlated state for a pair of such systems
is valid.
Proof. Necessity is trivial to prove. By lemma 6, the
transformation of interest corresponds to coupling to an
ancilla in a valid state by a linear symplectic transforma-
tion and marginalizing over the ancilla. Given that the
perfectly correlated state is a valid state, and given that
every part of this transformation clearly keeps one within
the set of valid states, the final bipartite epistemic state
will be valid.
It remains to prove sufficiency. We assume that the
transfer functional ΓA satisfies the isomorphism property,
that is, that the bipartite epistemic state resulting from
the transformation acting on half of the perfectly corre-
lated state, denoted µΓAB and having a uniform marginal
on B, is valid. The latter is described by its means dA
on A (the means on B are not well-defined because the
distribution is uniform on B) and by its covariance ma-
trix
γAB =
(
γA C
CT γuniformB
)
. (72)
The assumption that µΓAB is a valid epistemic state places
no restriction on dA, but it does restrict γAB to satisfy
the CUP condition, γAB + iλΣAB ≥ 0. Making use of
the result from linear algebra described in Eq. (39), we
infer that the CUP condition on γAB is equivalent to the
condition
γA + iλΣA ≥ C[γuniformB + iλΣB ]−1CT . (73)
This alternative form will be useful in what follows.
We need to show that µΓAB being a valid epistemic state
implies that ΓA acts in the manner described in Lemma 6.
It suffices to show that every valid epistemic state on AB
can be obtained from the perfectly correlated epistemic
state by some transfer functional of this form.
First, we consider the covariance matrix of the per-
fectly correlated state µcorrAB . This state is only defined as
the limit of a squeezed Gaussian state, as in Eq. (33), and
so in the following argument we consider finite squeezing
throughout, and only take the limit in the final stages
of our argument. It is convenient to change our squeez-
ing parameter s, for which s→ 0 is the desired limit, to
be reparametrised as s = exp(−r), and thus r → ∞ is
the desired limit. With this substitution, it is straight-
forward to show that the covariance matrix γcorrAB of the
perfectly correlated state µcorrAB is the r →∞ limit of
γcorrAB (r) =
(
D+(r) D−(r)
D−(r) D+(r)
)
, (74)
where D±(r) are diagonal real matrices defined by
D+(r) = cosh(2r) diag(1, λ
2, 1, λ2, . . .) , (75)
D−(r) = sinh(2r) diag(1,−λ2, 1,−λ2, . . .) . (76)
We note that the marginals on A and B have covariance
matrix D+(r) which, as r →∞, is the uniform distribu-
tion (as a limit of a Gaussian).
By acting on system A of the pair of systems AB,
initially described by the perfectly correlated state µcorrAB ,
with a general transformation of the form described in
Lemma 6, the resulting state µAB has covariance matrix
γAB(r) =
(
XTD+(r)X + Y X
TD−(r)
D−(r)X D+(r)
)
. (77)
where the matrices X and Y must satisfy Eq. (68). We
then wish to show that X and Y can be chosen such as
to produce any state of the form of Eq. (72) satisfying
Eq. (73). We want X and Y such that
C = XTD−(r) , (78)
γA = X
TD+(r)X + Y . (79)
As D−(r) is invertible, we can choose
X = D−(r)−1CT , (80)
Y = γA − CD−(r)−1D+(r)D−(r)−1CT . (81)
It remains to be shown whether X and Y can be chosen
as such, because they are constrained to satisfy the con-
dition given by Eq. (68). We now show that they can,
by demonstrating that the condition given by Eq. (68) is
equivalent to the condition given by Eq. (73).
Recall that γuniformB = limr→∞D+(r). We will substi-
tute D+(r) for γ
uniform
B in Eq. (73), and take the r →∞
limit at the final step. With the substitutions given by
Eqs. (78-79), the condition of Eq. (73) is expressed as
XTD+(r)X + Y + iλΣA
≥ XTD−(r)[D+(r) + iλΣB ]−1D−(r)X . (82)
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Rearranging gives
Y ≥ −iλΣA
−XT (D+(r)−D−(r)[D+(r) + iλΣB]−1D−(r))X .
(83)
We then make use of the following identity, which holds
for all r:
D+(r)−D−(r)
[
D+(r) + iλΣB
]−1
D−(r)
= −iλΣA . (84)
We thereby obtain
Y ≥ −iλΣA + iλXTΣAX . (85)
By taking the complex conjugate of this equation, we re-
cover Eq. (68). Therefore, in the limit r → ∞, where
D+(r) becomes the uniform distribution γ
uniform
B , we
have proved the equivalence of the conditions of Eqs. (73)
and (68).
As a final comment on transformations, note that we
do not need to separately specify how the epistemic state
of a system updates as the result of a measurement in
ERL mechanics; this follows from cases we have already
considered. By the assumption that ERL mechanics is
just classical mechanics with an epistemic restriction, ev-
ery measurement must be understandable as adjoining
some degrees of freedom of an apparatus to the system,
coupling these by a linear symplectic transformation, fol-
lowed by acquiring information about the apparatus. For
any valid set of indicator functions on the system, one can
achieve a measurement associated with this set by such
a procedure. The argument follows a similar logic to the
ERL-mechanical analogue of von Neumann’s dynamical
analysis of measurement, presented in Sec. III B 8. The
update needn’t always be analogous to the projection
postulate however. The manner in which the epistemic
state of the system updates depends on the particular
manner in which the measurement is implemented. (This
is analogous to how, in quantum theory, there are many
state update rules associated with a given POVM; even
for projective measurements the projection postulate is
just one of the possibilities.) We do not need to con-
sider this situation afresh because both components of
the process have been considered already: how the bi-
partite epistemic state of a pair of systems transforms
under a linear symplectic transformation, and how the
epistemic state of a system updates as a result of a mea-
surement on another system with which it is correlated.
B. Operational formulation of Gaussian quantum
mechanics
We review the Wigner representation, and then pro-
ceed to define Gaussian quantum mechanics. For further
reading on these topics, see Ref. [67, 68].
1. The Wigner representation
In the Wigner representation [67, 69], quantum states
are represented as real-valued functions over phase-space
that integrate to unity. Specifically, for a system of n
canonical degrees of freedom and following the notation
of Sec. II A, the Wigner representation for a quantum
state ρ is
Wρ(z) = Tr(ρAz) , (86)
where
Az =
n⊗
i=1
Azi , (87)
and
Azi =
1
pi~
∫
dy e−ipiy/~|qi − 12y〉〈qi + 12y| , (88)
and |q〉 is the position eigenstate. We note that these
operators satisfy Tr(Az) =
1
pi~ .
The operators Azi satisfy the identity
Tr (AB) = (pi~)n
∫
dzTr (AAz) Tr(BAz) . (89)
This identity follows from the fact that the Az, con-
sidered as vectors in the Hilbert-Schmidt operator
space, form a resolution of unity. Denoting Tr(AB)
as an inner product on the Hilbert-Schmidt opera-
tor space, 〈A|B〉, we have simply used the fact that
〈A| (∫ dz |Az〉 〈Az|) |B〉 = 〈A|B〉.
The Wigner representation of a Hermitian operator O
is the real-valued function WO(z) = Tr(OAz), and the
expectation value of O in state ρ is recovered by the Eu-
clidean inner product of the Wigner representations of O
and ρ,
(pi~)n
∫
dzWρ(z)WO(z) = (pi~)n
∫
dzTr(ρAz)Tr(OAz)
= Tr(ρO) , (90)
where we have used the identity (89).
The most general measurement allowed by quantum
theory, associated with a POVM {Ey}, also admits a
Wigner representation as a set of real-valued functions
over phase space that sum to the uniform measure over
the phase space. Specifically, we have
WEy(z) = (pi~)nTr(EyAz) , (91)
which, given that
∫
dyEy = I, implies that∫
dyWEy(z) = (pi~)nTr(Az) = 1 . (92)
The general form of the Born rule, which asserts that
given a preparation associated with quantum state ρ, and
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a measurement associated with POVM {Ey} the prob-
ability density for outcome y, Tr(ρEy), is recovered in
the Wigner representation as the Euclidean inner prod-
uct of the Wigner representation of the quantum state
with that of the POVM element associated with y,∫
dzWρ(z)WEy(z) = Tr(ρEy) , (93)
where we have again used Eq. (89).
For certain unitary operations, such as displacement
and squeezing operations, it is well-known how to de-
termine their effect within the Wigner representation.
However, we must consider how the most general trans-
formation, associated with a completely-positive trace-
nonincreasing linear map E , is represented in the Wigner
representation. (To our knowledge, this result has not
previously been made explicit in the literature on the
Wigner representation). Such a transformation can be
represented by a real-valued function over two copies of
the phase space, denoted WE(z|z′), which satisfies
WE(ρ)(z) =
∫
dz′Wρ(z′)WE(z|z′) , (94)
and has the form
WE(z|z′) = (pi~)nTr (AzE(Az′)) . (95)
This result can be proved as follows. Using the identity
of Eq. (89) and the definition of the Hermitian adjoint
E† of E , namely, Tr(E(A)B) = Tr(AE†(B)), we can infer
that
WE(ρ)(z) = Tr (E(ρ)Az) (96)
= Tr
(
ρE†(Az)
)
(97)
= (pi~)n
∫
dzTr (ρAz′) Tr
(E†(Az)Az′) (98)
= (pi~)n
∫
dz′Wρ(z′)Tr (AzE(Az′)) . (99)
Eq. (94) then follows.
2. Gaussian quantum mechanics
We define Gaussian states, measurements and trans-
formations in terms of their Wigner representations. The
Gaussian states are the ρ for which
Wρ(z) = Wρ(0)e
− 12 (z−d)T γ−1(z−d) , (100)
where γ is the covariance matrix of ρ and d is the vector
of its means.15 Gaussian states have Wigner functions
15 It is more common to define the Gaussian quantum states as
those for which the Wigner-characteristic function is Gaussian,
but because the latter is the Fourier transform of the Wigner
representation of the state, the two definitions are equivalent.
that are positive everywhere; note that the only pure
quantum states with positive Wigner functions are the
Gaussian pure states [4]. Next, we can define the Gaus-
sian measurements as those which, implemented on one
half of a system in a Gaussian state, necessarily leave the
other half in a Gaussian state as well. We can also define
the Gaussian operations as those which implemented on
a system or part of a system in a Gaussian state, take
the system to another Gaussian state. Doing so, one
finds that the Gaussian measurements and transforma-
tions are those whose Wigner representations are Gaus-
sian. Specifically, the Gaussian measurements are the
POVMs {Ey} for which we have
WEy(z) = WEy(0)e
− 12 (z−dy)T γ−1y (z−dy) ∀ y , (101)
where γy is the covariance matrix of Ey and dy is the
vector of its means, and for which
∫
dyWEy(z) = 1 for
all z. The Gaussian transformations are the CP maps E
for which we have
WE(z|z′) = WE(0|0)e− 14z′′T γ
−1
E z
′′+dTE z
′′
(102)
where z′′ ≡ (z, z′).
C. Proof of Equivalence
We can now provide the proof of theorem 1.
Note first that the Wigner representation of a Gaussian
state can be interpreted as a probability distribution on
phase-space. This is because it is both positive, by virtue
of the fact that a Gaussian distribution is positive, and
normalized to unity, which one verifies by noting that∫
dzWρ(z) = Tr(ρ
∫
dzAz) = Tr(ρI) = 1.
Note further that the Wigner representation {WEy(z)}
of a POVM {Ey} can be interpreted as a set of condi-
tional probabilities for the outcome to lie within dy of
y given that the ontic state is z. Again, positivity fol-
lows from Gaussianity. The fact that the WEy(z) form a
probability density over y for all z becomes evident when
one notes that
∫
dyWEy(z) = (pi~)n
∫
dyTr(AzEy) =
(pi~)nTr(AzI) = 1 for all z.
Furthermore, it follows from Eq. (93) that one can in-
terpret the probability density of obtaining outcome y in
a measurement associated with a Gaussian POVM {Ey}
upon a Gaussian state ρ as the probability density of ob-
taining outcome y given z weighted by the probability
density of z. In other words, the preparation procedure
associated with a Gaussian state ρ can be understood as
the preparation of a system at some unknown point z
in phase space, with probability distribution Wρ(z), and
the measurement procedure associated with a Gaussian
POVM {Ey} can be understood as revealing information
about z by the fact that different z may vary in the prob-
ability densities they assign to the different outcomes.
Finally, we can interpret the Wigner representation
WE(z|z′) of a Gaussian trace-preserving CP map E as
a conditional probability of z given z′ (thereby justifying
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the choice of notation). Positivity of WE(z, z′) follows
from its Gaussianity, and the fact that
∫
dzWE(z, z′) = 1
for all z′ is verified by noting that
∫
dzTr (AzE(Az′)) =
Tr (E(Az′)) = Tr (Az′) = 1 where the second identity is
due to the assumption that E is trace-preserving. Thus,
Eq. (94) can be interpreted as follows. If the initial dis-
tribution over phase space is Wρ(z
′), and the probability
of z′ being mapped to z is WE(z, z′), then the final dis-
tribution over phase space is
∫
dz′WE(z, z′)Wρ(z′).
We have seen, therefore, that the Wigner represen-
tation of Gaussian quantum mechanics yields the same
sorts of descriptions of preparations, measurements and
transformations that one finds in Liouville mechanics.
But are they precisely the subset picked out by our epis-
temic constraint? Yes. To demonstrate this, we need
only show that the Wigner representations satisfy the
conditions of the classical uncertainty principle (with λ
replaced with ~), that is, the conditions implied by de-
manding that the phase-space distributions satisfy the
classical version of the Heisenberg uncertainty relation.
From Eq. (4), we have that any quantum state ρ has
a covariance matrix γ(ρ) that satisfies the uncertainty
relation γ(ρ) + i~Σ ≥ 0. To relate this result to the
Wigner function, we require the following lemma:
Lemma 8 The covariance matrix γ(ρ) of a quantum
state ρ (defined in terms of quantum expectation val-
ues 〈f〉ρ) is equal to the covariance matrix γ(Wρ) of
its Wigner function Wρ, considered as a function over
phase-space (defined in terms of classical expectation val-
ues 〈f〉Wρ =
∫
dzWρ(z)f(z)).
Proof. All moments of the Wigner function are given by
the expectation values of symmetrically-ordered products
of the canonical operators. See, for example, Ref. [67] for
a proof; here, we reproduce this result in detail for the
first two moments. Recall the definition of the covariance
matrix of ρ, Eq. (3). We wish to rewrite this in the
Wigner representation. First, note that
γ(ρ) = 2Re Tr (ρ(zˆi − ξi)(zˆj − ξj))
= Tr (ρ [(zˆi − ξi)(zˆj − ξj) + (zˆj − ξj)(zˆi − ξi)]) .
(103)
The Wigner representations of quadratic observables are
Wzˆi(z) = zi, (104)
Wzˆizˆj+zˆj zˆi(z) = 2zizj . (105)
This follows from direct evaluation of the Gaussian inte-
grals in Eq. (90).
Thus, first-order moments of ρ coincide with those of
Wρ(z),
ξi = 〈zˆi〉ρ =
∫
dz ziWρ(z) = 〈zˆi〉Wρ(z) , (106)
and the covariance matrix of the quantum state ρ coin-
cides with that of the phase-space function Wρ(z),
γ(ρ) = 2
∫
dz(zi − ξi)(zj − ξj)Wρ(z)
= γ(Wρ) . (107)
Therefore, the Wigner representations of Gaussian
states satisfy the classical uncertainty principle, with
λ = ~. All that remains is to show that the Wigner
representations of Gaussian measurements and transfor-
mations coincide with the phase-space representations of
measurements and transformations in ERL mechanics.
Any POVM element E, when normalized, can be
viewed as a density operator. Thus, the covariance ma-
trix of a normalized POVM element, γ(E/Tr(E)), satis-
fies the Heisenberg uncertainty relation, γ(E/Tr(E)) +
i~Σ ≥ 0. This implies that the normalized Wigner func-
tion WE(z)/|WE(z)| where |WE(z)| =
∫
dz′WE(z) sat-
isfies the classical uncertainty relation, and thus WE(z)
is a valid indicator function.
WΨcorr(zA, zB) ∝
∏
i
δ(qiA − qiB)δ(piA + piB) , (108)
corresponds to a Gaussian state |Ψcorr〉〈Ψcorr|. Neces-
sity follows from the Choi-Jamiolkowski isomorphism in
Gaussian quantum mechanics, which ensures that trans-
formations E that lead to a Gaussian bipartite state when
acting on the perfectly correlated state in M×M,
ρ = (E ⊗ I)|Ψcorr〉〈Ψcorr| , (109)
are necessarily Gaussian transformations.
With this, we have proved Theorem 1.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the introduction, we emphasized that ERL mechan-
ics can reproduce a large number of quantum phenom-
ena. We have explained at length how it does so for sev-
eral important examples. These phenomena can there-
fore be understood intuitively in terms of a simple story
about uncertainty in a classical world. Given that ERL
mechanics is operationally equivalent to Gaussian quan-
tum mechanics, if a phenomena exists in Gaussian quan-
tum mechanics, then we are assured that it exists within
ERL mechanics and that such a story can be provided,
even if we do not bother to extract it from the formal-
ism. Therefore, to know the explanatory scope of ERL
mechanics, it suffices to determine which quantum phe-
nomena are found within Gaussian quantum mechanics.
Fortunately, much work has already been done in deter-
mining what aspects of quantum theory, in particular,
what aspects of quantum information theory, are present
in Gaussian quantum mechanics, and so we simply refer
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the reader to this work. The list includes: basic phe-
nomena of quantum theory such as the no-cloning the-
orem [70], the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen effect [60] and
quantum teleportation [71]; information-processing tasks
such as dense coding [72], quantum key distribution [73],
and quantum error correction [74]; and many aspects of
entanglement theory [75, 76]. For a review of the subject
of information theory using continuous-variable systems
and Gaussian quantum mechanics, see Ref. [68, 77].
The classical theory that we have used as our starting
point has been particle mechanics. However, we could
have equally well considered any degrees of freedom de-
scribed by canonical coordinates on a symplectic vector
space. In particular, we could have considered fields. In-
deed, the most significant application of Gaussian quan-
tum mechanics is to quantum optics. One can interpret
the theory proposed here as a classical statistical the-
ory of optics with an epistemic restriction which is op-
erationally equivalent to the subtheory of quantum op-
tics which consists of Gaussian states, measurements and
transformations. The set of Gaussian states is the set
of all coherent states (including the vacuum state), all
squeezed states (including quadrature eigenstates) and
all multimode versions of these. The Gaussian transfor-
mations are those that can be achieved using the stan-
dard toolkit of optical elements – beam splitters, phase
shifters and squeezers – as well as linear attenuation and
amplification. The Gaussian measurements can all be
constructed from a homodyne detection preceded by one
of the above transformations16. All experiments in quan-
tum optics that make use of only these elements can
therefore be furnished with an intuitive explanation in
terms of statistical optics with an epistemic restriction;
for instance, such a description of the quantum telepor-
tation experiment of Ref. [78] is provided in Ref. [63].
The explanatory scope of ERL mechanics adds further
credibility to the research program wherein the quantum
state is taken to be a representation of an agent’s incom-
plete knowledge of reality rather than a representation
of reality itself. A skeptic might challenge the notion
that our results constitute interpretational progress on
the grounds that the mystery of quantum theory has just
been shifted to the question: why the epistemic restric-
tion? We have several responses to this charge. First, any
progress in reconstructing quantum theory from simple
principles holds interpretational lessons, even if further
elucidation and justification of the principles is required.
Second, and more importantly, we feel that the interpre-
tation of Gaussian quantum mechanics in terms of ERL
mechanics is more compelling than most competing in-
terpretations, for instance, Everett’s [79] or the one of de
Broglie and Bohm [80], because the latter interpretations
are mathematically inspired – they start from the mathe-
matical formalism of quantum theory and attempt to tell
16 Note, however, that this does not include direct photodetection.
an ontological story that does justice to this formalism,
while the reconstruction provided here is conceptually
inspired – we start with a classical ontology that is con-
ceptually unproblematic, add the conceptual innovation
of an epistemic restriction, and derive the mathemati-
cal formalism of Gaussian quantum mechanics. Third,
we feel that the approach described here succeeds at un-
scrambling Jaynes’ omelette of ontological and epistemo-
logical notions in a more satisfying fashion than other
approaches.
Of course, although the length of the list of quantum
phenomena that are reproduced by ERL mechanics is
long, it is not complete. Neither ERL mechanics, nor any
classical statistical theory with an epistemic restriction,
can do justice to Bell’s theorem or the Kochen-Specker
theorem. We must grow the list of such outstanding phe-
nomena and focus upon them for it is these that will dic-
tate what other conceptual innovations are required to
reproduce the full quantum theory within this program.
The relation between Gaussian quantum mechanics
and ERL mechanics is strongly analogous to the relation
that exists between the stabilizer theory for qutrits [81]
and a classical statistical theory of trits with an epis-
temic restriction (trits are three-level classical systems
and qutrits are three-level quantum systems). The latter
sort of theory, which makes use of a classical phase space
over a discrete field, has been developed in Refs. [57, 82].
The proof that it is operationally equivalent to the sta-
bilizer theory for qutrits proceeds by showing that it
reproduces the discrete Wigner representation for odd-
dimensional systems that was proposed by Gross [83]
(which is positive on stabilizer states). Just as it is
well-known in quantum information circles that stabi-
lizer states are the natural discrete analogues of Gaus-
sian states, the classical statistical theory of trits with
an epistemic restriction of Ref. [57] is the natural dis-
crete analogue of ERL mechanics.
One is naturally led to ask whether one can find a sim-
ilar relation between the stabilizer theory for qubits and
and a classical statistical theory of bits with an epistemic
restriction. The latter sort of theory has been developed
by Ref. [2] and is commonly known as the “Spekkens Toy
Theory”. One finds that in this case the two theories in
question are not operationally equivalent. Such inequiv-
alence is inevitable because a classical theory with an
epistemic restriction is by construction a local noncon-
textual hidden variable theory and it is known that one
can prove Bell’s theorem and the Kochen-Specker theo-
rem within the stabilizer theory of qubits (for instance,
by using the GHZ version of Bell’s theorem [84]). For
the case of Gaussian quantum mechanics and the stabi-
lizer theory of qutrits, the fact that one can reconstruct
these from a restriction upon a classical statistical the-
ory shows that one cannot prove Bell’s theorem or the
Kochen-Specker theorem within these subtheories.
Another question that arises naturally is whether we
might be able to find another epistemic restriction that
yields a theory which is more comprehensive than ERL
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mechanics, that is, one that is operationally equivalent
to a subtheory of quantum mechanics that has a larger
scope than Gaussian quantum mechanics. As it turns
out, if one demands that this larger subtheory includes
Gaussian quantum mechanics, then the question has a
negative answer. The reason is that there is no subthe-
ory of quantum mechanics that is “between” Gaussian
quantum mechanics and the full theory, so there is noth-
ing to shoot for in such a reconstruction. To be pre-
cise, it has been shown [21, 85] that if one adds to the
set of unitaries allowed in Gaussian quantum mechanics
(those generated by quadratic Hamiltonians) even a sin-
gle unitary from outside this set and then closes under
composition, one obtains all unitaries. An analogous re-
sult is widely believed to hold (but to our knowledge has
not been rigorously proven) for the stabilizer theory of
qudits: if one adds any additional unitary to those al-
lowed within the stabilizer theory, commonly known as
the Clifford group, and closes under composition, one ob-
tains all unitaries over the qudits. (This question can be
rephrased in the language of quantum computation as a
question about the universality of a gate set [86].) In
other words, “next stop: quantum theory”.
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Appendix A: Motivation for the max-ent condition
In Sec. III A, we noted that one of the reasons for in-
corporating the max-ent condition into the epistemic con-
straint is that without it, one obtains a much smaller set
of valid measurements17. We are now in a position to see
why this is the case. Imagine a distribution over a single
17 We thank Robin Blume-Kohout for pointing this out to us. The
demonstration we provide is a modification of one that he sug-
gested.
system of the form
µtest(qA, pA) ∝ (1
2
G−q0,δq(qA) +
1
2
Gq0,δq(qA))
× (1
2
G−p0,δp(pA) +
1
2
Gp0,δp(pA))
where q0  δq  λ/p0, and p0  δp  λ/q0. This
satisfies the CUP because the variances are ∆qA ' q0
and ∆pA ' p0, such that ∆qA∆pA  λ (there are no
cross-correlations). However, because µtest is not a multi-
variate Gaussian it violates the max-ent condition. We
will be interested in the limiting case where δq, δp → 0
and q0, p0 →∞.
If there is no max-ent condition, then for a pair of
systems we would also have to allow a distribution of the
form
µ′test(qA, pA, qB , pB)
∝ µtest(qA, pA)G0,δq(qA − qB)G0,δp(pA + pB)
Note that qA and qB are strongly correlated (positively)
if δq is small and pA and pB are strongly correlated (neg-
atively) if δp is small. The correlation is perfect in the
limit that δq, δp→ 0. The distribution µ′test also satisfies
the CUP but not the max-ent condition.
Now imagine a Gaussian indicator function on A that
has variances ∆qA ' δ′q and ∆pA ' δ′p where q0 
δ′q  δq and p0  δ′p  δp. Because we can take
the limiting case of δq, δp → 0 and q0, p0 → ∞, these
inequalities place no constraint on δ′p, δ′q, so we can
consider an arbitrary Gaussian indicator function on A
that satisfies Eq. (49). It is not too difficult to see that if
distributions of the form of µ′test were allowed, then every
such indicator function will be ruled out.
The argument is by contradiction. We show that if
an indicator function satisfying Eq. (49) were allowed,
then it would imply a violation of the CUP. We assume
that the initial state of AB is µ′test where δq, δp → 0
and q0, p0 → ∞. First, note that for such a state, qA
prior to the measurement is arbitrarily close in value to
either q0 or −q0. Furthermore, given that we have chosen
q0  δ′q  δq, a measurement of an indicator function
with ∆qA ' δ′q can reveal which value qA takes with
arbitrarily high accuracy. By virtue of the arbitrarily
strong correlation between qA and qB in µ
′
test and the
lack of any influence from A to B, one would thereby
learn with arbitrarily high accuracy what the value of qB
was after the measurement (whether it is close in value
to q0 or to −q0). Meanwhile, such a measurement could
also distinguish with arbitrarily high accuracy whether
pA had a value close to −p0 or to p0 prior to the mea-
surement and again by virtue of the arbitrarily strong
correlation between pA and pB and the lack of any in-
fluence from A to B, one would thereby learn with ar-
bitrarily high certainty what the value of pB was after
the measurement (whether it is close in value to p0 or
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to −p0). Consequently, if such a measurement were al-
lowed, one would be able to infer both the values of qB
and pB after the measurement to arbitrary accuracy. Be-
cause this would violate the CUP part of the epistemic
constraint, such a measurement would have to be ruled
out. Therefore, if we relaxed the max-ent condition, then
the resulting theory would include none of the indicator
functions that are included in ERL mechanics.
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